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Abstract  
New Zealand is a world leader in the use of Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) to 
manage fisheries. Although the use of an ITQ system is not unique to New Zealand, 
no other country has used this system to the same extent as New Zealand. This has 
meant that, internationally, a lot of interest has been placed on how our system works 
and the level of success it has achieved. Generally, the New Zealand system is 
considered to be a success story, yet the system has changed a number of times since 
its inception in 1986. Despite the level of interest in New Zealand’s unique ITQ 
system, the current literature is unable to provide a complete account of the historic 
and current regulations surrounding it. This paper addresses this gap by documenting 
how the Quota Management System (QMS) functions and the changes it has 
undergone since its introduction. Reviewing these changes facilitates a deeper 
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1. Preface  
 
Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) based systems are currently used to manage 
individual fish stocks in a number of countries including Australia, the United States 
of America and Iceland. Theoretically, the use of this type of system has a number of 
benefits including promoting sustainable use of the resources and increased economic 
efficiency.
1 Yet despite this, to date no other country has used an ITQ based 
management system as extensively as New Zealand, where the Quota Management 
System (QMS) is used to manage all significant commercial species.  
 
The unique nature of the QMS has made it a natural case study for the use of quota 
based systems for resource management and generated international interest, both 
from researchers and policy makers, in how the system functions and its 
successfulness in achieving sustainability goals.
2 However, despite the high level of 
interest in this system, no single publication details how the system functions and 
documents the many changes that have occurred since its inception.
3 
 
This report addresses this gap by documenting how the QMS functions and the 
changes that have occurred since its introduction in 1986. Reviewing these changes 
facilitates a deeper understanding of the system itself, as well as providing insight into 
its potential limitations. To assist this understanding, challenges that are currently 
being faced by the New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries, and potential policies to 
address these challenges, are also briefly discussed to suggest how the QMS may 
evolve in the future. While this report covers the legislative changes that have 
occurred in the system, operational changes are not addressed. Therefore this report 
does not cover issues such as procedures for the monitoring and enforcement of catch 
levels.  
 
Copies of legislation and schedules are not provided within this report. But both past 
and present legislation is publicly available online at www.knowledge-basket.co.nz 
and http://www.legislation.govt.nz/. These websites may be of use to the reader as 
sources of additional information. 
 
The intended audience of this report is individuals who have some understanding of 
fisheries management, and may even have some familiarity with New Zealand’s 
QMS, but who wish to improve their understanding of the system including how it 
has evolved to the system that is in place today. Each chapter discusses a different 
theme and, together, they cover the majority of the elements of the QMS.  
 
Chapters can be read independently if the reader is interested in a particular aspect of 
the system, but a full understanding of the issues within each chapter is unlikely 
                                                 
1 ITQ based systems have been championed for resource management by economists for a number of 
years. Thus, there is a substantial volume of literature discussing the theoretical basis for these systems, 
including the associated efficiency benefits. As these aspects are already well covered in the literature, 
they will not be covered in this document. For more information on the economic theory behind ITQ 
based systems see Anderson (1995) or Batstone and Sharp (1999).  
2 The QMS has also been the focus of a number of academic studies to assess the implications of an 
ITQ based system (e.g. Connor 2000, Newell et al. 2005a). 
3 Partial attempts have been made though, including Straker et al (2002).   2
without considering related chapters. In some cases there are strong links between 
chapters and when these occur references are made within the text. However, there 
are also more subtle links between sections, so it is important to have a general 
understanding of the system in order to fully understand the issues being discussed.  
 
Information contained within this report has been gathered from a number of different 
sources including legislation, academic publications and official documents. This has 
been supplemented by input from individuals who are closely involved with the 
system, including some of those who were involved in the decision making process 
when changes occurred. Any mistakes made within the report remain those of the 
authors.    3
2. Setting Catch Levels to Ensure Sustainability 
 
ITQ based systems, such as the QMS, can be used to ensure sustainable utilisation of 
fisheries resources through direct control of harvest levels. To ensure sustainable 
utilisation, regulators must determine the spatial scale that species are managed at 
(and how adjustments are made to these areas), the process for setting sustainable 
harvest levels, the allocation of catch between the different fishing sectors and the 
definition of quota. Each of these issues is central to the system and strongly 
influences its success in ensuring fish stock sustainability. Thus, understanding how 
these issues are addressed in the QMS is the foundation for understanding how the 
system operates. This chapter discusses how these issues are dealt with in the QMS 
and outlines changes that have occurred.  
 
Before harvest levels can be identified, the management areas for each species must 
be selected, so this chapter begins with a discussion of the processes involved in 
identifying and altering management areas. Significant changes have occurred in this 
system. When the QMS was first implemented, management areas could not be 
altered, but now boundaries can be altered both with and without the approval of 
quota holders. A discussion of this evolution is followed by an examination of the 
theoretical basis for setting sustainable catch levels, the proxies required due to the 
imperfect information available on fish populations and the allocation of catch levels 
between sectors. This chapter concludes with a discussion of an exemption used for 
some species whereby a total allowable catch is set which does not meet the usual 
theoretical requirements.  
 
2.1 Managing Multiple Biological Populations 
 
A fish species can consist of numerous geographically isolated and biologically 
distinct populations. This sometimes means that managing a particular species at a 
national level is not the optimal method. Thus, each fish species in the QMS is 
subdivided into separate fish stocks defined by Quota Management Areas (QMAs), 
each of which is managed independently to ensure sustainability of the stock. 
 
QMAs are determined for each species based on the biological understanding of the 
stock distributions of the species at the time of its introduction in the QMS (Connor 
2001a). The starting point for determining the QMA boundaries for each species are 
the 10 Fisheries Management Areas (FMAs) which define New Zealand’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) (Fisheries Amendment Act 1986 S28B) (Figure 1). Due to the 
nature of fish populations, some QMAs incorporate multiple FMAs while others 
cover only part of a single FMA, leading to a varying number of QMAs per species. 
For example, some species, such as swordfish, have only a single QMA while others, 
such as paua, have eight.  
 
By splitting fish stocks into smaller areas, it is possible to maintain more control over 
the population size thus ensuring that it approximates a stock level that can sustain the 
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) (Batstone and Sharp 1999). But increasing the 
number of management areas also increases the costs associated with monitoring   4
enforcement and quota trading. So, the benefits of smaller management areas need to 
be considered alongside the increased costs. 
 





2.1.1 Alteration of QMAs 
2.1.1.1 Fisheries Amendment Act 1986 
Through time, knowledge regarding fish populations and the nature of their 
interactions may change. This may mean that the QMAs used to manage a species are 
no longer ideal. However, when the QMS was introduced with the Fisheries 
                                                 
4 http://www.fish.govt.nz/en-
nz/Publications/Ministerial+Briefing+04/Fisheries+Sector/Legislative+framework.htm   5
Amendment Act 1986 there was no clear process set out in the legislation regarding 
the alteration of QMAs other than within Section 28C (2): 
 
“The Minister may … specify separate total allowable catches for separately 
defined parts of any quota management area and may define total allowable 
catches by reference to methods of taking fish or the periods within which fish 
may be taken.” 
 
So the Minister was able to set different catch limits within a QMA, but was not able 
to alter the boundaries of the QMAs once they were set.  
 
2.1.1.2 Fisheries Act 1996 
The Fisheries Act 1996 changed this, giving the Governor-General (on 
recommendation of the Minister) the ability to amalgamate or split QMAs (Fisheries 
Act 1996 S25 (1)). Before making such a recommendation, the Minister would have 
to consider a number of factors including a stock’s biological characteristics and non-
commercial fishing interests and would have to consult with stakeholders. The 
proposed change also required the support of affected quota holders.
5 This support 
needed to be demonstrated through a public notification of their desire to have the 
boundaries altered and a written agreement supported by at least 75% of quota 
holders. This agreement would need to consider the proposed QMA boundaries, the 
species that comprised the stocks, quota share allocation in the new QMA and any 
other relevant matters.
6 Once the boundaries were altered, quota holders maintained 
all rights, obligations and liabilities that they held under the old QMA boundaries.  
 
However, this system did not allow for changes in the QMAs when quota owners did 
not agree to an alteration. This could be important as the Minister may wish to alter 
the QMA boundaries based on a change in understanding, but quota owners maybe 
reluctant to agree if they feel that the change will alter the profitability of their 
business. 
 
2.1.1.3 Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Act 1999 
The Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Act 1999 allows the Minister to change QMA 
boundaries without the agreement of quota owners. This amendment allows two 
different methods for generating a change in the QMA boundaries. The Minister can 
still alter a QMA with the support of quota owners if he believes that the purpose of 
the Fisheries Act would be better achieved with the new boundaries, as he was able to 
do previously (S25A). However, if the Minister cannot obtain support of the quota 
owners, he can still recommend that the QMA is altered if he believes that the change 
is necessary to ensure the sustainability of the fish stock after considering all 
alternatives. To do this, he must approve a plan that outlines the new boundaries, the 
species involved and the allocation of the quota shares in the new QMAs and he must 
                                                 
 
6 If squid QMAs are involved then this agreement must also consider whether method restrictions 
should be in place in the new QMA(s).   6




2.1.1.4 Fisheries (Remedial Issues) Amendment Act 2001 
The Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) was introduced into the system in 2001.
8 Thus, 
Section 6 of the Fisheries (Remedial Issues) Amendment Act 2001 was passed to 
ensure that ACE holders were kept informed of changes to QMA boundaries. 
Subsequent to this Act being passed, when the Minister proposed to alter the QMA 
boundaries without the agreement of quota owners, he was required to not only notify 
the quota owners, but also other parties holding ACE in the affected management 
areas. When the quota owners did provide an agreement to the Minister’s proposal, 
they were required to inform parties who held ACE in the relevant QMA.  
 
Despite the legislative power of the Minister to alter QMA boundaries, the provisions 
provided under Section 25 have never been used. Only once since the introduction of 
the QMS have QMA boundaries been altered and this occurred through a legislative 
change. The Fisheries Amendment Act 1995 subdivided a paua stock (PAU 5) into 3 
separate QMAs (PAU 5A, PAU 5B and PAU 5D) through the introduction of 
Sections 28BB – 28BD into the 1983 Fisheries Act. Individuals who owned quota in 
the former stock received quota that was equivalent to a third of their PAU 5 quota 
holding in each of the three new stocks. In the four months following the amendment, 
individuals could purchase or lease less than 3 tonnes of quota despite the minimum 
trading restrictions in the QMS (See Section 3.6.2 for more details on trade 
restrictions). This allowed individuals to adjust their quota holdings in the new QMAs 
to match their requirements. After this four month period, holders of quota in these 
three areas could hold less than 3 tonnes and continue to participate in the industry, 
but any trades completed after this time were subject to minimum trading restrictions.  
 
2.1.2 Multiple Species Stocks 
While most species in the QMS are managed independently, sometimes groups of 
species are considered together. These groups tend to be either groups of similar 
species or species that are often caught together, so they are combined in the system 
for administrative ease (Clement and Associates 2003). For example, two species of 
arrow squid (Nototodarus gouldi and N. sloanii) are considered as a single species 
group in the QMS due to their similarity. Other species that are often caught together 
such as Flatfish (which comprises eight species) are also managed together for 
simplicity (Sullivan et al. 2005). Therefore, a ‘stock’ in the QMS may include one or 
more species within a defined area (the QMA). 
 
2.2 Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) 
 
In the QMS, the Minister of Fisheries is responsible for ensuring that fish stocks are 
maintained at or above a level that can produce the MSY (S13 of the 1996 Fisheries 
                                                 
7 If the plan is considering squid quota, the Minister must also consider whether method restrictions 
should apply. 
8 See Section 3.2.3 for more information on ACE and its introduction.   7
Act and 28D of the amended 1983 Fisheries Act).
9  This means that controls must be 
set so that the biomass level can support the maximum sustainable yield (BMSY). 
This provides the conditions to maximise the yield of the fishery without 
compromising sustainability. Once MSY is identified, the total allowable catch (TAC) 
of a species for a given year can be determined (see Section 2.4 for more details).  
 
Although the concept of MSY is both theoretically and intuitively simple, in practice 
it is difficult to use MSY to determine the optimal total catch. Given the current low 
levels of understanding of fish population dynamics and information regarding 
specific species, it is very difficult to identify the true value of BMSY or MSY for any 
population. Therefore, it is necessary to use other measures as proxies for MSY. Two 
reference points are being used in New Zealand’s QMS: a static measure (Maximum 
Constant Yield); and a dynamic measure (Current Annual Yield) (Sullivan et al. 
2005).  
 
2.2.1 Maximum Constant Yield (MCY) 
The maximum constant yield (MCY) defines a constant catch level that is estimated 
to be sustainable, with an acceptable level of risk, at all probable future levels of 
biomass (Sullivan et al. 2005). Thus, this catch level should be able to be harvested 
each year without depleting the fish stock (Newell 2004). Since this figure is constant 
by definition, when the fish stock decreases, the proportion of the stock that is 
removed through fishing actually increases. Therefore, the estimates of the MCY 
must be set sufficiently low to ensure that the future viability of the population is not 
compromised, particularly in times of low abundance (Sullivan et al. 2005). So while 
the MCY provides a static measure of MSY, it is also one that varies annually as a 
proportion of the fishable biomass. 
 
2.2.2 Current Annual Yield (CAY) 
Fish populations naturally vary from year to year due to a number of factors including 
interspecies interactions and changes in the environment, as well as human fishing 
pressure (BjØrnstad et al. 1999). Thus, to get the maximum sustainable yield from a 
fishery, it may be necessary to alter the total allowable catch each year to incorporate 
these fluctuations in population size (Sullivan et al. 2005). The current annual yield 
(CAY) is calculated yearly and it incorporates these fluctuations by applying a fixed 
reference level of fish mortality to the current fishable biomass (Newell 2004). So the 
CAY will provide a time varying estimate of the MSY, but will remain a constant 
proportion of the fish population (Sullivan et al. 2004).  
 
2.3 Estimation of MSY 
 
For each stock, estimates of MCY and CAY are reported, where possible, in the 
annual report from the Fishery Assessment Plenary (e.g. Sullivan et al. 2005). The 
Plenary Reports are produced each year following meetings of each of the 14 
                                                 
9 MSY is defined in the 1996 Fisheries Act as “the greatest yield that can be achieved over time while 
maintaining the stock’s productive capacity, having regard to the population dynamics of the stock and 
any environmental factors that influence the stock”.    8
Fisheries Assessment Working Groups. Each of these groups covers different issues 
and species within the QMS and is made up of Ministry of Fisheries staff, science 
providers and representatives of stakeholder groups (see Sullivan et al. 2005 or any of 
the earlier reports for more details). 
 
The bulk of the Plenary Report contains a report on most of the species managed 
under the QMS and key non-QMS species. These reports contain information on the 
fishing activity, biology and stocks and areas including any new data available on the 
species. Stock assessment is also included which provides estimates of the biomass, 
MCY and CAY where possible. Based on the stock assessment, the working groups 
put forward a recommendation on the status of the stocks which suggests whether the 
current harvest yield is sustainable or could be increased or decreased. This 
recommendation gives the Minister insight into whether the harvest is currently 
moving the stock to a level above, below or approximately at the BMSY. The amount 
of information that is available on each species determines the size of the species 
summary report in the Plenary Report and also the accuracy of the estimates of MCY 
and CAY.  
 
2.4 Total Allowable Catch 
 
Using the estimates given in the Plenary Report regarding the MSY, various other 
sources of information, and an assessment of risk, the Minister determines how much 
of the fish stock should be harvested in a given year, or the total allowable catch 
(TAC).
10 The Minister is required to set the TAC at a level which ensures that the fish 
stock will remain at a stock size that is able to sustain the MSY or will allow the stock 
to move towards this size (S13 of the FA96).
11 This level of catch considers the total 
harvest from commercial, recreational and customary fishing. Thus, while the Plenary 
Report provides guidance to the Minister, recommendations are not necessarily 
followed through and most TACs remain constant from year to year (Sanchirico et al. 
2006). Some species may have the same recommendation in the plenary report for a 
number of years before changes are made. In other species, there may be either no 
new science suggesting alteration of the TAC or no new science available.  
 
2.5 Total Allowable Commercial Catch (TACC) 
 
Before any commercial fishing can take place, the Minister must identify the share of 
the TAC that can be harvested commercially -- the total allowable commercial catch 
(TACC) -- for each QMA and quota stock. The Minister must set this limit with 
regard to the level of non-commercial fishing, including both customary and 
recreational fishing (Fisheries Amendment Act 1986 S10 and Fisheries Act 1996 Ss20 
21). Under current policy, when the Minister is allocating catch levels between fishing 
sectors he must first identify the allowance of customary catch. This allowance must 
                                                 
10 While the Plenary Report provides guidance to the Minister, recommendations are not necessarily 
followed through and most TACs remain constant from year to year (Sanchirico et al. 2006). Some 
species may have the same recommendation in the plenary report for a number of years before changes 
are made. 
11 However, species listed in the Third Schedule are an exception to this (See Section 2.6 for more 
details).   9
be sufficient to satisfy all customary requirements so that it does not constrain the 
level of customary catch. Once the customary allowance is identified, the remainder 
of the TAC can then be allocated to the commercial sector, as the TACC, and the 
recreational sector. The allocation of catch between these two sectors is made by the 
Minister at his discretion. Neither of these sectors has priority in the legislation; the 
decision on the allowance for each sector is considered simultaneously.
12  
 
When the QMS was first introduced with the passing of the Fisheries Amendment Act 
1986 there was no requirement for the Minister to report a total allowable catch, as it 
is known now. Instead, the Minister was only required to report the total allowable 
commercial catch, which was deemed the TAC in the 1983 Act.  
 
Subsequent to the introduction of the Fisheries Act 1996, the Minister had further 
requirements placed upon him before making a decision regarding the level of the 
TACC. This Act restricts the Minister to setting the TACC after the TAC and to 
ensuring that the TACC does not exceed the TAC (S20). He must also consider the 
level of stock mortality that the fishing itself is causing and must consult with 
individuals and organisations that have an interest in the level of the TACC (S10).  
 
Once the TACC is set for the year, fishing rights are distributed to quota owners 
through the QMS (See Section 3.2 for more detail). 
 
2.6 Alternative TACs for species on the Third Schedule 
 
Section 14 of the Fisheries Act 1996 allows the Minister to set alternative TACs for 
the sixteen species listed in the Third Schedule. As outlined above in Section 2.4, 
under Section 13 of the Fisheries Act 1996, the Minister is required to set a TAC 
which moves the population toward, or maintains the population at, a level that can 
support the MSY. However, for species listed in the Third Schedule, the Minister is 
able to set a TAC at a level that does not fit these requirements as long as he considers 
that the purpose of the Act will be better served with an alternative TAC.  
 
Species are included in the Third Schedule if it is not possible to estimate the MSY, if 
a national allocation for New Zealand has been set through international agreements 
or if the stock is managed on a rotational or enhanced basis (e.g. scallops). In 2004, 
this was expanded to allow the addition of stocks that contain one or more highly 
migratory species (Fisheries Amendment Act (No. 3) 2004). Some of these species 
are covered under the Third Schedule for only some of their QMAs (e.g. Green-lipped 
mussels) while other species are covered for all of their QMAs (e.g. Blue shark). Only 
the Governor-General, by Order of the Council, is able to add or remove species from 
the Third Schedule if they fit the requirements listed above.  
 
Further changes were made to this section of the Act with the passing of the Fisheries 
Act 1996 Amendment Act 1999 which added Sections 14A and 14B to the legislation. 
These sections allow some stocks in a multispecies fishery to be fished to a level 
below the level required to support the MSY if this would increase the value 
                                                 
12 See Chapter 5 for more information on the interaction between recreational and commercial fishing 
sectors including a discussion of the issues relating to allocation of catch between these two sectors.    10
generated by the group of stocks. Following a proposal by quota holders and a 
recommendation by the Fisheries Minister and the Minister responsible for the 
Environment Act 1986, the Governor-General can apply section 14B to the quota 
management stocks listed in the Third Schedule. Under this section, the Minister must 
set a TAC that will maintain the stock above a level which will ensure the long-term 
viability of the population. In doing this, the Minister must be satisfied that quota 
owners have taken, and will continue to take, all reasonable steps to minimise the take 
of the stock (e.g. modifying fishing methods and areas). To use this section, 95% of 
the quota holders must support the proposal. To date, this section of the Act has never 
been used.  
   11
3. Allocation, Trade and Holding of Quota 
 
The ways in which quota is allocated and traded and the rules over its ownership 
directly influence how the quota market and the fishery will operate. The management 
authority must determine initial allocation (to whom, how much), the nature of the 
right (exclusivity, quality of life, duration), ownership limits (minimum or maximum 
quantities, nationality of owners) and limits over transfers (divisibility, restrictions on 
sale, leasing options). In New Zealand, the nature of the property right, and how it is 
managed, has changed since the introduction of the QMS. This chapter follows these 
developments from an initial distribution of deepwater fish quota to established 
participants, through to a system that manages virtually all commercial species and 
where new quota are auctioned to the highest bidder. 
 
This chapter discusses the allocation methods that were used in the implementation of 
the QMS and some of the problems that were encountered including the need to alter 
the definition of quota and a lengthy appeals process. The exclusion of Maori interests 
halted the entry of new species into the QMS which provided time for officials to 
revise the allocation mechanism used to bring additional species into the QMS, 
reducing the importance of previous catch history and subsequently passed as part of 
the 1996 Fisheries Act. Thus new allocation process outlined in the 1996 Act and 
subsequent amendments is discussed. Finally the chapter outlines regulations 
regarding quota ownership and trading including minimum and maximum holding 
requirements before concluding with brief remarks on how the structure of the 
industry has changed in response to the design of the quota owning and exchange 
system.  
 
3.1 Allocation under the 1983 Fisheries Act 
 
Identifying an acceptable quota allocation mechanism is fundamental to ensuring the 
success of an ITQ based system. So when the New Zealand Government wished to 
introduce the QMS they undertook a substantial consultation process before finalising 
the allocation process in legislation.
13 This process assisted in maintaining industry 
support for the system and included producing documents outlining the proposed 
system and holding a number of meetings around the country (Connor 2001a). It was 
decided that commitment of the fishers to and dependence on the industry would be 
the key determinants for allocation of quota (S28E of the amended 1983 Fisheries 
Act). While the same criteria was used for determining the quota allocation to fishers, 
the process that was used differed between deepwater and inshore species.  
 
When the QMS was first introduced, 26 species were brought into the system, most of 
which had multiple QMAs (Boyd and Dewees 1992).
14  
                                                 
13 However, this consultation process lacked effective consultation with Maori despite systematically 
including all other stakeholders (Connor 2001a).  
14 The species that were introduced into the system initially are – barracouta, blue cod, bluenose, 
alfonsino, elephant fish, flatfish, grey mullet, red gurnard, hake, hoki, hapuku (bass or grouper), John 
Dory, ling, blue moki, oreo, orange roughy, red cod, school shark, gemfish, snapper, rig, stargazer 
(monkfish), silver warehou, tarakihi, trevally and blue warehou (Newell 2004).    12
 
3.1.1 Deepwater Quota 
In 1983, a precursor to the QMS (Deepwater Allocation system) was introduced to 
control seven deepwater fish stocks (Sharp 1997). At this time, the deepwater 
fisheries stocks were relatively healthy and this system was implemented to prevent 
over fishing or overcapitalisation from occurring as it had in the inshore stocks (Clark 
and Major 1988). To be eligible for the individual quota (IQ), companies needed to 
prove that they had the ability to access the fishery but also that they had the 
processing investments necessary to process catch. Since some of the companies were 
unable to reach the relevant limits themselves, company aggregations were created to 
enable smaller companies to reach the threshold levels. Thus, based on these criteria, 
IQ was allocated to the large fishing companies (or fishing company aggregations) 
that were currently competing for the deepwater fish stocks (Dewees 1989). Holding 
IQ entitled companies to choose to harvest their entitlement in whatever way that they 
wished including the use of foreign chartered vessels (Sharp 1997). Although the 
Government was unable to authorise the trading of this quota, de facto trading and 
leasing of the shares was reported (Sissenwine and Mace 1992). 
 
The quota allocated under this scheme was granted for ten years (Connor 2001a). 
However, in 1985 these allocations were confirmed by the Government and granted in 




3.1.2 Inshore Quota 
The allocation of quota for the inshore species was undertaken in a number of steps at 
the start of the QMS (Connor 2001b). Allocation of quota to inshore fisheries was 
more complex than in the offshore fisheries due to the greater need to reduce catch 
levels and higher number of individuals involved.  
 
3.1.2.1 Ability to be allocated quota 
Under the amended 1983 Act, quota was to be allocated to vessel holders based on 
their commitment to, and dependence on, the industry. Based on these requirements 
two key groups were ineligible for quota: part-time fishers and people who were 
involved in the fishing industry, but who did not own boats. Both of these groups 
failed to obtain any compensation for their loss and, in the case of part time fishers, 
often lost a major or their only source of income.  
 
To be assigned quota in the initial allocation, individuals had to be deemed a 
commercial fisher. According to the Fisheries Act 1983, to be a commercial fisher an 
individual or company needed: 
•  earnings of NZ$10,000 or more from fishing and to earn more than 80% of 
their income from fishing; or 
                                                 
15 The QMS was originally to be introduced in October 1985 for the 1985/1986 fishing season 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 1984). Thus, initial quota allocation was carried out in 1985. 
However, due to the long appeal process for inshore species, the introduction of the QMS was delayed 
by 12 months, beginning in October 1986. See the next section for more details.    13
•  earnings from fishing to form a vital part of their income; or 
•  to be subsistence fishers (Bess 2005). 
With the new requirements, a large number of part time fishers, many of whom were 
Maori living in rural areas, were removed from the industry (Bess 2001).
16 This step 
was a start towards achieving the Government’s goal of rationalising the fishing 
industry and reducing capacity. Although it would have been possible to include these 
individuals in the new system, to do so would have lead to much higher transaction 
costs (Connor 2001a). The Fisheries Act 1983 removed these individuals without 
compensation, resulting in a significant cost saving to Government (Sinner and 
Fenemor 2005) but also significant losses to the people involved. 
 
3.1.2.2 Quota allocation  
Commitment to and dependence on the industry for commercial fishermen in the 
inshore fishstocks was determined by a vessel’s catch history (Connor 2001a) with the 
ITQ for each fish stock allocated to vessel owners based on their vessel’s catch 
history in the 1981/82, 1982/83 and 1983/84 fishing seasons (Bess 2005) (S28E of the 
amended Act). The Ministry announced its intention to base quota allocation on 
previous catch history in 1983. But in an attempt to reduce the incentives to inflate 
catches, the fishing seasons considered were not announced until May 1985 (Clark 
and Duncan 1986).  
 
The process for determining an individual vessel owner’s catch history had a number 
of steps. Firstly, regional catch history review committees were established to validate 
the actual catch of each vessel for each of the three fishing seasons. Secondly, any 
notable gaps in catch history were assessed and where there were legitimate reasons 
for being unable to fish, these gaps were compensated for. Finally, vessel owners 
were notified of the catch history of each of their vessels for the three years. It was 
then up to the vessel owner to determine which of the three fishing years would be 
used to calculate their catch history. Thus, when a vessel owner had multiple vessels, 
the owner selected the year that would give them the best catch history over all 
vessels. From the selected catch history, the vessel holders’ provisional maximum 
individual transferable quota (PMITQ) was calculated, stating the individual’s largest 
possible entitlement. 
 
Vessel owners who believed that their PMITQ did not represent their usual catch 
history could apply to have an administrative review by one of the six regional catch 
history review committees (Connor 2001a). These committees were reasonably 
informal and lacked decision-making power, but they were able to provide 
recommendations to the national committee and the Director General of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries who was able to alter assessments (Muse and Schelle 
1988). The high rate of objections was unexpected. The introduction of the QMS was 
delayed by a year because the vast number of reviews requested took eight months to 
process (Connor 2001a).
17 This delay meant that the fishing activity of some 
individuals had changed substantially between the introduction of the QMS in 
October 1986 and the final reviewed fishing year of 1983/1984. These individuals 
                                                 
16 In practice, this piece of legislation was misinterpreted and this led to more individuals being 
removed from the system than was necessary. 
17 The QMS was expected initially to be implemented at the start of the 1985/1986 fishing season 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 1984).   14
therefore submitted reviews to have their PMITQ reflect their commitment and 
dependence on the fishing industry in 1986.  
 
Once PMITQs were identified, the Government needed to bring the levels of harvest 
allowed under the assigned PMITQ down to the newly proposed TAC levels (or 
TACCs as they are known in the later legislation).
18 This was a major issue as the 
catch levels were generally around 10 percent higher than the proposed TACs but in 
some species, such as snapper, the difference was much higher with catch levels 36% 
higher than the TAC (Falloon 1993). To ensure that the vessel owners were aware that 
the total PMITQ holdings in many fish stocks exceeded the TAC, they were also 
informed of their guaranteed minimum individual transferable quota (GMITQ) at the 
same time as their PMITQ. GMITQ represented the amount of quota that the 
individual would receive if the reduction in catch required to get from the total 
PMITQ to the TAC was spread proportionately across all of the assessed catch 
histories (Connor 2001a) (S28F of the amended 1983 Act). This allowed individuals 
to identify the possible range of quota that they would be entitled to catch once the 
QMS was in place. 
 
3.1.3 Quota Buy-back scheme 
Twenty-one of the species that were introduced into the QMS at this time had PMITQ 
allocations that exceeded the TAC (Sissenwine and Mace 1992). The Government had 
two options to reduce the quota holdings: either buy back the excess quota; or reduce 
the total quota holdings pro rata under Section 28D of the amended Fisheries Act.
19 
The Government selected the buy back option. By buying the quota back, the 
Government was able to both reduce harvesting entitlements and provide 
compensation for individuals who were no longer allowed to fish (Sharp 1997). This 
allowed them to retain the support of the industry (Kidd 2000).  
 
The set up of the scheme provided two incentives for individuals holding PMITQ to 
participate (Connor 2001a). First, it created an opportunity for individuals to have all 
or part of their PMITQ purchased by the Government allowing them to leave the 
industry while obtaining a financial benefit. Second, the PMITQ holders knew that if 
enough quota was not tendered back to the Government, TAC levels would be 
achieved through a pro rata reduction in assigned quota, so the quota that they 
received could be as low as their GMITQ.  
 
All vessel owners were invited to participate in the quota buy-back scheme and 
submit bids of compensation that they would be willing to accept in return for giving 
up a specified amount of quota (Connor 2001a). In theory, once the tender round had 
been completed, the Government would determine the price that would allow it to 
meet its reduction targets. This price would then be paid to all individuals whose 
                                                 
18 The difference between the total PMITQ allocated and the TAC is likely to have been greater than 
the actual difference between the total catch levels in the 1985/86 fishing season and the TACs since 
fishers chose their highest catch history year and individual allocations were increased through the 
objection process, leading to a higher total PMITQ allocation than actual fish caught in a given fishing 
season (Sissenwine and Mace 1992). Thus, the Government needed to compensate the industry for 
more tonnes of fish than it actually received in fishing reductions. 
19 Since the quota were rights to harvest a specified tonne of fish rather than a proportion of the TACC, 
the Government had to purchase the quota back rather than administratively reducing the TACC.    15
tender price did not exceed this value and the Government would acquire the relevant 
tendered quota. Thus, equality would be maintained between individuals who sold 
quota back to the Government. However, given the bid prices that were offered, it was 
impossible for the Government to meet their objectives. Buying back just 60% of the 
required reductions at the bid prices offered would have cost $NZ100 million (Muse 
and Schelle 1988). To avoid this, the Government decided upon a clearing price so 
that they could attain about 25% of the required quota and then set up another tender 
round. The second tender round was the quota holders’ last chance to sell quota 
before the Government cut the PMITQ proportionally without compensation (Connor 
2001a). In this round the Government set the price around 20% lower than the prices 
paid in the first round. Despite this lower price, there was a strong response from the 
vessel owners and this substantially reduced the quota holdings. In total, the buy-back 
process cost the Government $42.4 million but reduced quota holding by 15,700 
tonnes (Sissenwine and Mace 1992). 
 
Despite the incentives to participate, the reductions in PMITQ holdings from the 
second tender round were not large enough to prevent further action being required 
(Clark and Major 1988). As threatened earlier, the remaining cuts in PMITQ were 
then applied on a pro rata basis in the 21 fish stocks whose total PMITQ entitlements 
were still above the TAC by utilising Section 28N. This was only carried out on the 
proportion of holdings above the GMITQ to ensure that no one was left with less than 
their original guaranteed minimum (Connor 2001a). While these latter cuts were 
carried out without compensation, the individuals who lost quota during this final 
round had first rights to future quota increases at no cost under Section 28T of the 
amended Act (Ministry of Fisheries 2002).  
 
The total reduction from historical catch levels, based on catch histories, to the TACs 
in the 1986/1987 fishing year was 6% (Sissenwine and Mace 1992). But these 
reductions were not spread evenly across the species. For the 21 species that were 
involved in the buy-back scheme followed by pro-rata cuts, harvest entitlements were 
reduced by 24%. More than 85% of the payments required for this process were spent 
on only four species with nearly 50% spent on the snapper fisheries alone (Sissenwine 
and Mace 1992).
20 This enabled catch reductions of 54% in these four species.  
 
An additional appeal process was set up to assist in maintaining the fairness of the 
system. Quota owners had 28 days from the notification of their PMITQ (or lack of 
PMITQ) to lodge an appeal (Section 28H of the amended Fisheries Act). These 
appeals were heard by the Quota Appeal Authority, which was formed in the same 
amendment (S28A) and established in early 1987 (Connor 2001a). The Quota Appeal 
Authority consisted of three members and its sole function was to hear the appeals 
and make decisions regarding their outcome.
21 For the majority of species this appeal 
process took 3 to 4 years to complete, but some of the appeals were still being held in 
the mid-1990s (Connor 2001a). In total, over 2000 appeals were heard, around a 
thousand of which resulted in additional quota being allocated and 100 leading to 
reductions in quota allocations (Falloon 1993). This process lead to quota holdings 
exceeding the initial TACs by, on average, 10%. But there was a large amount of 
                                                 
20 The four species that required the majority of the payments were snapper, rig, school shark and 
hapuku bass. 
21 The Quota Appeal Authority was made up of a solicitor or barrister (Chairperson), someone 
appointed after consultation with the Fishing Industry Board and someone independent of the Ministry.   16
variation across species. For example, the quota holdings for snapper increased by 
36% (Falloon 1993).  
 
Despite the long time frame involved in dealing with these claims, it was vital to be 
able to ensure that the initial quota allocations were carried out in a way that was 
considered fair because of the large economic benefits that holding quota entails.   
 
The allocation process assigned quota exclusively to vessel owners. Therefore, 
individuals that were involved in generating the catch history such as skippers and 
crew were left out, as were fishing communities that supported the fishing fleets.  
 
3.1.4 Injunctions through Treaty Claims 
In 1987, 3 new species were introduced into the QMS (paua, jack mackerel and 
squid). In the same year, Maori obtained a series of injunctions which prevented the 




Despite the injunction, two species were introduced during this time as their 
introduction had the approval of Maori and they were already partially introduced into 
the system prior to the injunction. As part of the Maori Fisheries Act 1989, packhorse 
lobster and spiny rock lobster were introduced into the QMS (Ss 49-73 of Maori 
Fisheries Act 1989).
23 The proposal to introduce rock lobster into the QMS was 
established much earlier and was passed as part of the Maori Fisheries Act 1989 as it 
was the only relevant piece of fisheries legislation being passed at the time. By then, 
problems with the ITQ allocation method used to introduce the initial species into the 
QMS had been identified. Thus, when rock lobster was introduced, the criteria and 
appeal process used during the quota allocation process was tightened up. This meant 
that the introduction of these species into the system became relatively easy and the 
appeals process associated with this fishery was completed before some of the initial 
QMS species, despite being introduced three years later. 
 
3.1.5 Moratorium on Fishing Permits and Tendering Quota 
Despite the settlement of Treaty claims, the introduction of species into the QMS did 
not recommence in 1992. Problems with the system had become apparent especially 
regarding the lengthy appeal process and the difficulty of assessing commitment and 
dependence (Bess 2005). Another problem that needed attention was the behaviour 
change that was observed in fishers. They recognised that catch history was the key 
determinant of the quota allocation process and, thus, increased their catch levels in 
non-QMS species. To prevent over-exploitation of the non-QMS species, a 
moratorium was put in place preventing the issuing of new fishing permits (Fisheries 
Amendment Act (No. 3) 1992). This moratorium was initially intended as an interim 
measure, but remained in place until the passing of the Fisheries Amendment Act 
(No. 3) 2004 (See the Section 3.3.2 for more details). 
                                                 
22 See Chapter 4 for more information on Maori Treaty issues surrounding the QMS. 
23 While initially the rock lobster quota were granted for 25 years, the permits were later extended in 
perpetuity based on submissions from the industry and advice from Professor L G Anderson (an 
economist and academic specialist in the economics of fisheries management) (Waitangi Tribunal 
1992a).   17
 
The Ministry proposed reviewing the quota allocation process, suggesting that a 
tendering process would avoid the problems associated with allocation based on catch 
history. The proposed two-tiered system received Cabinet approval in September 
1992 (Ministry of Fisheries 2002). Under this system, existing fishers would have 
preferential rights, at least in some species, while remaining quota would be tendered 
openly. This would revoke the rights of the non-QMS species permit holders to have 
their catch history turned into quota upon introduction to the QMS (Bess 2005). 
However, in the twelve months following this decision, no legislative amendment was 
passed and industry opposition was growing. By early 1994, officials within the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries were again reviewing the options for allocation 
and Cabinet subsequently agreed to return to allocation based on catch histories 
(Ministry of Fisheries 2002). Despite the agreement, the system was not sustainable, 
and, therefore, the allocation method still required amendment.  
 
3.2 Translating Quota into Fish 
 
3.2.1 Quota as a fixed tonnage 
When the QMS was first introduced in 1986, quota was defined as a right to harvest a 
fixed tonnage of a particular species in a QMA each year (Sanchirico et al. 2006). 
Thus, the Government needed to buy and sell quota to decrease or increase the level 
of the TACC (Kerr et al. 2003). At this time, the Government anticipated that, at least 
on average, future TACs would increase on the belief that better management would 
lead to larger stocks (Townsend et al. 2006). However, when the Government was 
faced with the potential collapse of the orange roughy fishery and consequently 
needed to vastly reduce the TAC, this system was deemed to be too expensive and a 
new system was devised (Connor 2001a).  
 
3.2.2 Quota as a Percentage of TACC 
Under the Fisheries Amendment Act 1990, quota entitled their owners to a proportion 
of the TACC instead of the right to catch a fixed tonnage of fish (S15). Quota 
holdings were standardised to one hundred million shares per fish stock and allocated 
to quota holders based on quota holdings at the time of transition.  
 
With quota defined as a proportion of the TACC, the Minister was now able to alter 
the TACC for a given fish stock without selling or purchasing quota from the 
commercial sector. This change not only removed the Government’s financial 
liability, but also shifted the burden of risk associated with the uncertainty 
surrounding future catch limits from the Government to the fishing industry (Kerr et 
al. 2003). Although this may have effects on investment into the fishing industry, it 
also provides incentives for the industry to invest in research into science and 
management information that will help to reduce the uncertainty surrounding stock 
size and dynamics (Connor 2001a).  
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3.2.3 The Introduction of ACE 
In 2001, the system underwent further change with the introduction of annual catch 
entitlements (ACE) which are assigned to quota holders based on the share of total 
quota they hold (expressed in shares) and the TACC. Once the TACC for a given year 
is known, the kilogram equivalent of each quota share is calculated and transferred to 
the quota owner on the first day of the fishing year as ACE. This determines the 
tonnage of fish that the quota owner is able to catch within the next fishing year. 
 
In one sense, the introduction of ACE was not a radical departure from the existing 
system. However, it allowed for clear separation between the right to harvest a 
specific amount in a particular year and the ownership of the resource in the future. 
This had distinct benefits. Prior to 2001, quota owners were leasing their quota for a 
fixed term which essentially meant that they were leasing the long-term right to fish 
for a short period.
24 By allowing the separation of the current harvesting ability and 
the long-term ownership of the resource quota, owners were now able to sell their 
current harvesting entitlement, while retaining their long-term ownership of the 
fishery.  
 
Although ACE was introduced in the legislation in the 1996 Fisheries Act, technical 
limitations prevented its implementation for five years. In 2001, FishServe was 
created (Fisheries (Transfer of Functions, Duties, and Powers to the New Zealand 
Seafood Council Limited) Order 2001). FishServe now administers and delivers a 
number of statutory services surrounding the QMS including recording catch effort 
returns, ACE management, quota management and vessel registration (Seafood New 
Zealand 2005). This has meant that the maintenance of quota and ACE ownership 
registers are no longer the Ministry’s role. FishServe was set up initially for six years 
but subsequently had its contract extended reflecting the benefit that outsourcing this 
work has had for the industry and the Ministry (Seafood New Zealand 2005).  
 
3.3 Allocation under the 1996 Fisheries Act  
 
In 1994, Cabinet agreed in principle to the legislation that included the allocation of 
new quota based on previous catch history after Maori obligations were met. This was 
finally passed as part of the 1996 Fisheries Act. For any new species subsequently 
introduced into the QMS, 20% of the quota would be allocated to Maori under the 
Treaty of Waitangi Settlement while the remaining quota was to be allocated to 
fishing permit holders in proportion to their catch history (Clement and Associates 
2003). Any remaining quota (‘headroom’ quota) would usually be available through 
open public tender.
25 The 1996 Fisheries Act was more definitive in determining the 
allocation process, but catch history was still used to determine the provisional ITQ 
and ultimately the final ITQ allocation. However, the new Act did make some 
changes to this process, such as to the definition of catch history. Under the 1996 Act, 
individuals are now notified of their provisional ITQ rather than their provisional 
maximum ITQ as previously. So individuals are made aware of the amount of quota 
                                                 
24 For additional information on trading mechanisms within the QMS see Section 3.4. 
25 In this tender process, the Crown uses discriminatory auctions. This means that successful bidders 
pay the price that they actually bid. The industry requested that uniform price auctions were used 
instead so that all successful bidders pay the same price, but the Crown rejected this request.   19
that they are likely to receive and no longer receive notification of the range of quota 
they may be allocated.  
 
Initially the way that quota allocations were carried out under the 1996 Act depended 
on the characteristics of the fishery (S32). If, prior to introduction into the QMS, catch 
was controlled by Individual Catch Entitlement (ICE), then provisional catch history 
(PCH) was allocated equivalent to a fisher’s ICE.
26 However, ICE only ever existed 
for a very small number of fisheries and the vast majority of PCH was allocated based 
on catch history from the default fishing years beginning on the 1
st of October 1990 
and 1991. Occasionally PCH was also calculated based on the first 12 months after a 
person was issued a fishing permit pursuant to Section 2(2) of the Fisheries 
Amendment Act 1994. For tuna species, the qualifying years that were used to 
determine PCH were identified by the Minister prior to the species’ introduction to 
the QMS. Once a vessel holder had PCH assigned, assuming that they held a current 
fishing permit, this was used to allocate quota to the individual.  
 
Under this Act, if there was any quota that was not allocated to fishers or Maori, the 
remainder was allocated to the Government (S49). The Government would then 
usually make this quota available through a tendering process.  
 
The 1996 Fisheries Act also removed the consideration of commitment and 
dependence (Bess 2005). This Act instead focused on sustainability and utilisation 
(S8) and, thus, firmly lodged the focus of fisheries management on economic and 
biological (sustainability) concerns, and away from the social considerations that are 
represented by ensuring the inclusion of fishers with past and present association. 
However, to provide recognition of individuals with past association, the Fisheries 
Act 1983 Amendment Act 1999 created a provision to allow the descendants of 
deceased fishing permit holders to inherit the fishing permit and ultimately the PCH. 
Prior to this amendment, fishing permits were non-transferable which meant that 
descendants of fishing permit holders did not receive quota despite the PCH of their 
relative. To be eligible for the permit transfer, the deceased individual must have held 
a current fishing permit when they died and died after the 1
st of October 1996. This 
exception expires on 30 September 2007 (Jones 2004).  
 
3.3.1 Fisheries Amendment Act 2004 (No. 2) 
The passing of the Fisheries Amendment Act 2004 (No. 2) again changed the way 
that quota was allocated. This amendment stopped the use of ICE as a tool for 
controlling catch of non-ITQ species, thus removing ICE as a mechanism upon which 
to base PCH allocation. The other mechanisms used remained in place.  
 
                                                 
26 ICE is an annual amount of a fish stock that the permit holder is able to catch in a non-ITQ fishery 
that has a commercial catch limit (Bess 2005). In most respects it is similar to ACE in that it 
determines the amount of fish the permit holder is eligible to catch but it is not transferable and it is 
only able to be fished by those permit holders that it has been allocated to (Clement and Associates 
2003). While ICE has been effective in minimising overcapitalisation and reduce the ‘race for catch’ 
which often occurs under competitive catch limits, it is inferior to ITQ since it is not divisible or 
transferable (Bess 2005).   20
3.3.2 Fisheries Amendment Act 2004 (No. 3) 
The Fisheries Amendment Act (No. 3) 2004 reduced the dependence of the system on 
PCH when allocating quota. Non-QMS species generally now fall into two groups 
and these determine the quota allocation method used when a species enters the QMS. 
If the species is listed on either Schedule 4C or 4D of the Fisheries Act 1996, PCH 
will be used to determine the quota allocation, but only if the species is introduced 
into the QMS prior to 1 October 2009 (Section 29A). If a species is introduced after 1 
October 2009, PCH will not be considered and the quota is automatically allocated to 
the Crown and Te Ohu Kai Moana (TOKM).
27 Species that are not listed on either of 
these schedules will not have PCH considered for quota allocation. Instead of 
considering PCH, when these species are introduced into the QMS, the Crown and 
TOKM will receive 80 000 000 and 20 000 000 quota shares respectively. Crown-
held quota will usually then be made available to the fishing industry and other 
interested parties through the Government quota tendering process. Tuna inside New 
Zealand fisheries’ waters and highly migratory species outside New Zealand fisheries’ 
waters are exempt from the requirements above and despite not being listed on the 
schedules will continue to have their quota allocated based on PCH.  
 
3.4 Quota Trading 
 
The efficiency benefits associated with trade within ITQ based systems are well 
identified in the literature (e.g. Batstone and Sharp 1999). However, in practice 
allowing quota trading to occur is complicated and in the 1996 Fisheries Act itself 
there are nearly fifty sections dedicated to quota trading and its surrounding issues (Ss 
124-173).  
 
Under the QMS, individuals holding quota are free to sell it as they wish (Clark 
1993).
28 No pre-trade approval is required nor is there any limit on the number of 
times that the quota can be sold (Newell 2004). The quota is divisible so that quota 
owners can trade parts of their quota.
29 All trades that occur must be registered before 
the buyer is able to use the quota (Kerr et al. 2003). To facilitate effective trades both 
centralised quota trading exchanges and brokers have been used.  
 
3.4.1 The Quota Trading Exchange 
To allow for relatively easy transfer of quota between buyers and sellers of quota, a 
centralised quota trading system was set up in January 1987 (Clark and Major 1988). 
This exchange was developed and implemented by the New Zealand Fishing Industry 
Board with the support of other organisations and was run by the New Zealand Fish 
                                                 
27 TOKM is the corporate trustee which manages Maori fishing assets. See Section 4.7.1 for more 
details. 
28 However, there are some restrictions on the amount of quota that is able to be held. For more 
information on holding restrictions see Section 3.5. 
29 The 1986 Fisheries Amendment Act introduced minimum trade levels for buying or leasing quota of 
100kg for administrative ease (Section 28S(7)). However, this restriction has subsequently been 
repealed. This change becomes important in developing fisheries which have low or non-existent 
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Quota Exchange Ltd.
30 The trading exchange itself was accompanied by fish brokers 
and trading information to give as much knowledge to potential buyers and sellers as 
possible (Sanchirico et al. 2006). Trading occurred for two hours every day (Clark 
and Duncan 1986) and quota holders had access to the central computer system 
through a national video-text system. However, this system was unable to meet the 
needs of the fishing industry in the format that it was set up in (Clark and Major 1988) 
and the low volume traded meant that the system was shut down later that year.  
 
3.4.2 Lack of Central Trading Exchange 
In the years following the closure of the Quota Trading Exchange, the industry 
continued trading quota. This was mostly carried out through bilateral trading and 
quota brokers facilitating the trade (Kerr et al. 2003). While no official statistics 
available, it is believed that brokers handle most transactions between small and 
medium size quota holders while larger companies have specialist quota managers on 
staff to engage in bilateral trading with other large companies (Newell et al. 2005b).  
 
3.5 Leasing Quota and Transferring ACE 
 
Although many quota holders wish to either sell or fish their quota, others would 
prefer to maintain their fishing rights while allowing another person to fish their quota 
allocation in the current fishing period. Thus, a number of quota holders lease their 
quota (or sell their ACE subsequent to 2001 which is effectively the same thing) to 
others. By doing so, they are able to gain an income from their quota even if they are 
unable or unwilling to catch their entitlement (Clark and Major 1988).  
 
Leasing quota was legally complicated as individuals were leasing the long-term right 
to fish for a short period of time (Townsend et al. 2006). So in fact, individuals who 
held the lease were leasing the ownership right to the resource. This situation was 
simplified in 2001 when ACE was introduced (See Section 3.2.3 for more details on 
ACE). With the implementation of ACE, individuals became able to purchase the 
right to harvest fish for a particular fishing season without a change in the ownership 
of the property right.  
 
The increased use of the Internet has provided a convenient medium for a centralised 
trading exchange. Therefore, over the past five years, various online systems have 
been established to facilitate trade. 
 
3.5.1 ACETrader 
In 2003, TOKM set up the first online ACE trading system. Although the system was 
set up by the organisation formed to deal with Maori fisheries claims, the trading 
system was available to all current and potential participants in the fishing industry. 
However, this site was not successful and was shut down.  
 
                                                 
30 The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, the Federation of Commercial Fishermen and the Fishing 
Industry Association were all involved in setting up the quota trading exchange, while New Zealand 
Fish Quota Exchange Ltd was set up to manage the exchange.   22
3.5.2 FishStock 
In 2004, an online auction site (FishStock – www.fishstock.co.nz) for trading ACE 
was set up by FishServe (Sanchirico et al. 2006). FishStock allows quota holders to 
relatively easily auction their ACE for a particular fishing season.  
 
FishStock has a number of different options available for users to enable it to meet the 
needs of people in the industry (FishServe 2006a). The auctions can take one of two 
formats. Individuals can advertise ACE that they are wishing to sell on the site and 
people can compete to purchase it. The reverse can also occur with people listing 
ACE that they wish to buy and other people can compete to sell it, just like a tender 
process. These auctions can consider either ACE from a single species and QMA or 
multiple species and/or QMAs. A number of options are available to the person listing 
the auction, including setting the auction’s closing date, start price and buyout price.
31 
The person listing the auction also has the opportunity of listing a reserve price. If no 
reserve price is listed, then the ACE must be sold to the highest bidder (or bought 
from the lowest bidder in the case of a reverse auction).  
 
As with the earlier trading exchange, individuals must be registered with FishStock to 
be able to participate in an auction. However, viewing an auction does not require 
registration. While registration is free, FishStock charges a listing fee and commission 
for all auctions. Currently, it costs $16.65 to list an auction on the site whether or not 
it is successful and FishStock takes a commission of 2% (plus GST) of the winning 
bid (FishServe 2006b).  
 
3.5.3 FishTech Ltd. 
In addition to the above trading systems, a private company, FishTech Ltd., was set 
up in 2003 to facilitate trade of ACE between individuals. This was designed to 
reduce the amount that is paid in deemed values for fish stocks where differential 
deemed values are used (See Chapter 7 for more information on deemed values). 
 
All individuals that choose to participate in the system temporarily transfer their ACE 
holdings to FishTech just prior to the completion of the fishing season. ACE holdings 
are then reallocated amongst members at essentially zero cost. This is organised in 
such a way that the total amount of deemed values to be paid is minimised. The 
benefit gained from doing so is then shared amongst all of the individuals involved. 
This system avoids the higher penalties that must be paid in fish stocks that are 
managed under the differential deemed values system. While some of the members 
may face deemed values that they otherwise would not be paying, this system is 
organised so that no individual will be worse off by participating in the scheme since 




                                                 
31 The buyout price is the price that the person who listed the auction is willing to accept to complete 
trade before any bids are placed. Once a single bid has been placed the buyout option is no longer 
available.   23
3.6 Constraints on Holding 
 
Under the QMS, quota holders are able to sell their quota to whomever they wish. 
While this provides the opportunity for an efficient market structure, it can also lead 
to undesirable outcomes, such as reduced New Zealand-based ownership or anti-
competitive behaviour. To reduce the likelihood of these unwanted effects arising, a 
number of restrictions on quota holding and exchange have been put in place.  
 
3.6.1 Foreign Ownership 
To maintain domestic ownership of New Zealand fisheries, certain rules were 
imposed that, on the whole, ensure that only New Zealanders or New Zealand-owned 
companies are able to own quota. Attempts to prevent foreign ownership of quota 
resulted from requests made by the industry during the initial consultation process 
(Crothers 1988).  
 
Under the 1986 Amendment Act, quota could not be allocated to licensed foreign 
fishing craft, individuals from overseas or to companies controlled outside of New 
Zealand (Ss 28X-28Z). In addition to this, no one, other than Government, was able to 
sell or lease quota to foreign parties. Individuals were only deemed eligible for quota 
if they were ordinarily a resident of New Zealand. For a company to be allocated 
quota, it had to be at least 75.1% New Zealand-owned (Clark 1993).
32 However, this 
regulation was difficult to enforce because of the complex ownership structures of 
many companies (Connor 2001b). 
 
With the introduction of the 1996 Fisheries Act, the restrictions on foreign ownership 
were altered. Exemptions are now possible and this gives some foreign companies the 
right to own both quota and ACE (Connor 2001b). However, in order to obtain quota 
and ACE, overseas companies must get the approval of the Ministers of Fisheries and 
Finance and the Overseas Investment Commission. They will only get this approval if 
it can be demonstrated that New Zealand will benefit from the exchange (Ss 56- 57).
33 
But if New Zealand ceases to benefit from any exemption granted, Section 58 of the 
Act stipulates that ownership of, or interest in, quota and ACE can be taken away 
from foreign companies without any compensation being offered.  
 
3.6.2 Maximum and Minimum Holdings 
Maximum holding limits were introduced to inhibit monopolistic behaviour and to 
ensure that “there [was] a diversity of ownership and an opportunity to enter the 
fishery” (Hansard debate on the Fisheries Bill, 31 July 1996). Under the 1986 
Amendment Act, no one could hold more than 20% of the quota (either leased or 
owned) for any QMA and fish stock. However, there were two exceptions to this. 
First, if a species was listed in Schedule 1A of the Act, no one could own more than 
35% of the entire quota available for that species, regardless of QMA boundaries. The 
                                                 
32To be defined as “ordinarily a resident of New Zealand”, individuals had to have spent at least 2.5 
years out of the last 3 years in New Zealand (Boyd and Dewees 1992). 
33 Initially, exemptions did not require the approval of the Overseas Investment Commission. However, 
following a review of the 1996 Fisheries Act by Hartevelt (1998), the approval of this commission was 
required (Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Act 1999).   24
species listed in this schedule tended to be deep-water and mid-depth species (Connor 
2001b). Second, once rock lobster was introduced into the QMS, a maximum 
ownership of 10% within each QMA was established (Connor 2001b). 
 
These limits were altered in the 1996 Fisheries Act, under Section 59, to allow for a 
default aggregation up to 35%. From then on, individuals could hold up to 45% of the 
quota for species listed in the Fifth Schedule (equivalent to Schedule 1A in the 
amended 1983 Act). This amendment reflected the high level of investment required 
to participate in these fisheries.  
 
There are three additional species-specific exceptions to the general maximum 
holding limits: individuals cannot hold more than 20% of paua quota in a single 
QMA; they cannot have more than 20% of the total bluenose quota; or more than 10% 
of spiny rock lobster quota in a single QMA. However, the Minister is able to consent 
to holdings in excess of these limits (S60). As with the foreign owned quota, the 
Minister can also revoke this approval or include provisions. Currently, there is no 
aggregation limit for holding ACE (FishServe 2006c). 
 
Minimum holding limits for leasing and owning quota were also set in 1986. No 
person was able to hold quota equivalent to less than 5 tonnes of a finfish species, 3 
tonnes of rock lobster or 1 tonne of any shellfish species within any QMA (S28S of 
the Amended 1983 Fisheries Act). The Maori Fisheries Act 1989 amended this 
section by introducing a 3 tonne minimum holding limit for rock lobster within each 
QMA.  
 
The 1996 Fisheries Act placed limits on the minimum level of ACE held. Minimum 
ACE holding levels are available to be used for all species, but there is no requirement 
for them to be used. Thus, minimum holding levels have only been put in place for a 
few species, all of which are listed in the Eighth Schedule. For example, fishers from 
scallop, oyster and spiny rock lobster fisheries must hold a minimum of 3 tonnes of 
ACE and fishers from paua fisheries must hold at least 1 tonne of ACE. The Fisheries 
Amendment Act 2000 introduced minimum holding requirements for South Island 
freshwater eels requiring individuals to hold at least 4 tonnes of ACE within any of 
the QMAs to be able to participate in this fishery.  
 
3.7 Ownership and Trading Patterns 
 
In the period immediately following the introduction of the QMS, there was a rapid 
change in the quota ownership structure (Falloon 1993). During this time, the industry 
consolidated (Bess 2000) and 23% of people who were assigned PMITQ had sold it 
all by the end of the first year (Sinner and Fenemor 2005). Between October 1986 and 
April 1988, there were 15,580 quota sales involving 453,000 tonnes and 3,417 leases 
of quota involving 253,000 tonnes (Sissenwine and Mace 1992). The sum of these 
transactions is greater than the total amount of quota allocated, so some quota must 
have been either sold or leased multiple times during the first couple of years. This 
initial consolidation presumably led to a more efficient industry with the removal of 
less competent operators (Sissenwine and Mace 1992).  
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Many quota owners did sell their quota, either through the buy back scheme or after 
the introduction of the QMS, so that they could leave the industry. Other quota 
holders, however, sold their quota to larger companies, but leased it back, thus 
enabling them to continue fishing (Falloon 1993). At this time, some of these large 
companies bought large quantities of quota in order to secure their position in the 
industry (Sinner and Fenemor 2005).  
 
Before the introduction of the QMS, it was suggested that there would be an increase 
in the concentration of the industry and that small companies would not be able to 
compete and be forced out. Connor (2000 and 2001b) found that most fish stocks 
showed an increasing concentration in quota ownership, but these were not 
accompanied by large changes in distribution.
34 These changes have occurred 
gradually, following the rapid changes of the first couple of years.  
 
While it was initially thought that small fishing companies would be likely to leave 
the industry, this has not been the case. Newell and Sanchirico (2003) investigated the 
changing structure of the fishing industry and their findings suggest that it is the 
medium sized operations, rather than the smaller companies, that are leaving.  
 
Despite an increase in the concentration of quota markets, a large number of quota 
and ACE holders remain in the system. Between the implementation of the system 
and 1998, the total number of participants in the system averaged more than 1,500 and 
individual fish stocks had a median of 45 quota owners (Kerr et al. 2003).  
                                                 
34 Connor’s findings of increases in concentration have been supported by other work (e.g. Newell and 
Sanchirico 2003; Stewart and Callagher 2003).   26
4. Indigenous Rights 
 
When an ITQ based system is introduced to manage a resource, the access to its use 
becomes restricted (by law or by economics) to individuals holding quota. Thus, if 
there are individuals who have a prior claim to the use of the resource, conflict can 
arise. In New Zealand, the introduction of the QMS assumed that there would be no 
effect on Maori fishing claims, which were established in the Treaty of Waitangi. But 
subsequent claims and reports by the Waitangi Tribunal disputed this, leading to a 
significant and lengthy settlement process between Maori and the Crown. 
 
Under the Treaty of Waitangi and subsequent fisheries legislation, Maori had the un-
extinguished rights to the use of marine resources. However, the practical 
implications of these rights were not always appreciated. This chapter discusses the 
changing awareness of Maori fishing rights over time, including Maori fishing claims 
in the context of the QMS. The developments regarding Maori fishing claims and 
their impact on the QMS are discussed in detail in this chapter from the initial 
opposition from the Muriwhenua to the introduction of the system, through to the 
allocation of commercial assets to individual iwi. In addition to their commercial 
claims, Maori also have customary claims to fisheries resources to collect fish and 
shellfish for non-commercial purposes such as events on Marae. Consequently, the 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the legislation, both past and present, which 
protects Maori customary fishing rights and provides for Maori input into the 
management of culturally significant areas.  
 
4.1 European Settlement and the Treaty of Waitangi 
 
The traditional Maori diet was highly dependant on food from the aquatic 
environment. Apart from birds, dogs and rats, oceans and freshwater ecosystems were 
the only source of animal food for Maori (Waitangi Tribunal 1988). Early Maori had 
extensive knowledge of their fisheries and had an ownership system in place which 
reduced the risk of exploitation (Bess 2001). Traditionally, Maori utilised a large 
proportion of the open sea with fishing grounds that were up to 25 miles from the 
coastline and large fishing trips, which caught tonnes of fish, were a common 
occurrence (Waitangi Tribunal 1988). The fish that they caught were not only used for 
personal and local consumption, but also for trade between tribes. When Europeans 
started arriving in New Zealand, Maori extended this trade system and began to 
supply Pakeha ships in exchange for other resources.  
 
In 1840, the Treaty of Waitangi was signed in an attempt to resolve some of the 
conflict between Maori and Pakeha settlers. But there were significant differences 
between the Maori and English versions of the Treaty. The most important difference 
between the two versions, with regard to fisheries, is found in the second article. 
While the English version grants Maori “exclusive and undisturbed possession of 
their lands and estates, forests, fisheries and other properties”, the Maori version 
guarantees Maori unqualified chieftainship over their lands, villages and treasures   27
(Treaty of Waitangi Information Programme 2006).
35 So Maori believed that they 
retained control of their resources while the settlers believed that the Crown could, 
from that point on, impose regulatory controls on resources within New Zealand. Both 
versions of the Treaty grant Maori ownership of their lands and fisheries. 
 
4.2 Post Treaty Fisheries Legislation  
 
There has been limited treatment of Maori fishing rights in fisheries legislation until 
recently. But their rights have been acknowledged to some extent in legislation since 
the passing of the Fish Protection Act 1877 (Batstone and Sharp 1999). Section 8 of 
this Act states that “nothing in this Act … shall be deemed to repeal, alter or affect 
any provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi, or take away, annul, or abridge any of the 
rights of the aboriginal natives to any fishery secured to them thereunder”. Other 
legislation was also put in place to allow for the creation of exclusive fishing grounds 
for the use of local Maori and tribes, but this was later repealed and no fishing 
reserves were ever set up (Waitangi Tribunal 1983). Subsequently, fisheries 
legislation has recognised Maori fishing rights through the inclusion of sections 
stating that the legislation will not affect Maori customary fishing rights.  
 
4.3 Awareness of Maori Fisheries Claims 
 
In the past, many Maori may not have been aware of fisheries legislation, how it 
affected them and their customary rights. Many Maori lived in rural areas and 
fisheries legislation is unlikely to have had a major impact on their day-to-day lives, 
especially when there was plenty of fish available. Thus, Maori did not have a reason 
to complain about the way that their rights were affected under changing legislation, 
at least not until the QMS was introduced.  
 
The 1983 Fisheries Act stated that none of the fishing regulations in the Act would 
affect Maori customary fishing rights (Section 88(2)). However, it was not until 1985 
that this provision was actually tested.  
 
In 1984, Tom Te Weehi (Maori of Ngati Porou descent) was caught with a number of 
undersized paua which he had collected for his personal consumption. He was 
consequently charged with breaching the Fisheries Act (Sinner and Fenemor 2005). 
But Te Weehi defended this charge stating that he was collecting the paua as part of 
his customary fishing rights under Section 88(2) of the Fisheries Act 1983. While Te 
Weehi was initially found guilty, in August 1986 Te Weehi’s appeal to the High 
Court was granted and the conviction was quashed.
36 This case was the first time that 
Maori customary fishing rights were successfully used as a legal defence and it 
represents a turning point in the way that Maori viewed their customary fishing rights.  
 
                                                 
35 The Maori version of the Treaty does not explicitly state that fisheries were included in the 
settlement. However, it upholds their chieftainship of their lands, villages and treasures, thus implying 
their continued access to fisheries (Waitangi Tribunal 1983).  
36 The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries sought approval to appeal this ruling but this approval was 
not granted.   28
The first Treaty claim came from a group of iwi from the far North of the North 
Island, the Muriwhenua, in 1985 (Bess 2001). Their objection initially focused on the 
then current plan to introduce large marine reserves that would prevent all fishing in 
the chosen areas. But during the processing of this claim, the changing focus of 
fisheries management and the imminent introduction of the QMS became apparent. 
This led the Muriwhenua to alter the focus of their claim. Instead of trying to prevent 
the creation of marine reserves in the area, they challenged the way in which the QMS 
would effectively quash Maori Treaty rights. In December 1986, as part of this claim, 
the Waitangi Tribunal wrote to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries asking that 
the notification of fishers of their ITQ allocation be delayed until the Tribunal had 
finished assessing the claims that were currently lodged. However, because of 
statutory obligations and the fact that the ITQ system was already in place, this 
request was rejected (Waitangi Tribunal 1983). The subsequent enquiry and report by 
the Waitangi Tribunal on the Muriwhenua case was not completed until 1988, by 
which time the QMS was well established.  
 
4.4 The Introduction of the QMS 
 
During the development and implementation of the QMS, the Government assumed 
that Maori and their rights under the Treaty would not be affected since this system 
was put in place to manage commercial fisheries (Clark and Major  1988).
37 
Consultation that was carried out with the New Zealand Maori Council prior to the 
introduction of the system failed to see conflict between customary rights and the 
QMS. This prevailing view is clearly illustrated in Section 88(2) of the 1983 Fisheries 
Act which stated that “nothing in the Act shall affect any Maori fishing rights”.
38  
 
While the regulators did not see any relevance between the QMS and Maori rights 
under the Treaty, iwi did (Wallace 1998). This system not only provided something 
tangible for Maori to claim, but also led Maori to question whether their rights were 
being compromised (Falloon 1993). The Crown, through the Treaty of Waitangi, had 
already granted Maori unextinguishable rights to fisheries resources yet now the 
Crown was giving the commercial property right to commercial fishers through the 
QMS (Waitangi Tribunal 1992a). Maori did not object to the introduction of the 
property rights based system for managing fisheries and they could see the distinct 
advantages that it had for the environment. In fact, the QMS has all of the 
characteristics that Maori would want to see in a fisheries management system. But 
they were concerned about the impact that the system had on their customary rights 
(Falloon 1993).  
 
The Waitangi Tribunal report on the Muriwhenua claim concluded that a new 
agreement was needed and that the newly introduced QMS was “in fundamental 
                                                 
37 Through the legislation, two key assumptions have been made regarding Maori and their fishing 
practices (Bess 2001). These are, firstly, that Maori never had a system for managing fisheries and, 
secondly, that their fishing activity should be limited to subsistence use. But in actual fact, Maori had a 
well developed property rights based system in place well before settlers arrived in New Zealand and 
fish played an important role in trade between tribes and subsequently with settlers (Waitangi Tribunal 
1988).  
38 Interestingly, this differs from previous Acts which state that nothing shall affect existing Maori 
fishing rights (Waitangi Tribunal 1992a).   29
conflict with the Treaty’s principles and terms” (Waitangi Tribunal 1988). The High 
Court subsequently agreed with this view (Batstone and Sharp 1999) and an 
injunction was put in place preventing the introduction of additional species into the 
QMS (Falloon 1993, Bess 2001, Sinner and Fenemor 2005).  
 
4.5 Interim Settlement 
 
4.5.1 Maori Fisheries Act 1989 
With an injunction in place which prevented further species from entering the QMS, 
negotiations were carried out between Maori and the Crown to address Maori 
grievances. These negotiations resulted in the Crown implementing an interim 
settlement, which was passed into law as the Maori Fisheries Act 1989 (Bess 2001). 
This Act only had limited support from Maori and failed to address all of their 
concerns. However, it was a starting point to addressing the inconsistencies of the past 
(Waitangi Tribunal 1992b). 
 
This Act is in multiple parts. Part I establishes the Maori Fisheries Commission and 
the transfer of assets from the Crown. Part II declares rock lobster to be included in 
the QMS. Part III authorises the declaration of taiapure.  
 
4.5.1.1 Maori Fisheries Commission 
The Maori Fisheries Commission was set up under the Maori Fisheries Act 1989 to 
administer Maori fishing rights and facilitate entry into and development of the 
fishing industry by Maori (Waitangi Tribunal 1992a). The Commission, under the 
1989 Act, received $10 million and 10% of existing quota from the Government. The 
transfer of the quota was carried out in four separate transfers of 2.5% of the current 
TACC with the final transfer occurring by the 31
st of October 1992. This settlement 
led to the Government actively trading in the quota market to fulfil the quota transfer 
requirement (Bess 2005). However, it was not possible for the Government to obtain 
all of the quota required. Thus, under Section 42 of the Act, they transferred the 
equivalent dollar value for the missing quota (TOKM 2003).  When cash was 
transferred, the Commission decided to retain this cash in a trust to be used to 
purchase the quota when it became available.  
 
At the time of the 1989 Maori Fisheries Act, the QMS was still a reasonably new 
system that had been introduced to increase the efficiency of the fishing industry 
through, at least in part, the consolidation of the industry. Splitting Maori fishing 
assets amongst all iwi seemed to be contrary to the purpose of this new system. Thus, 
Aotearoa Fisheries Limited (AFL) was set up under the 1989 Maori Fisheries Act in 
order to make money for Maori from the settlement assets and to acquire additional 
assets (Day 2004). The profit that was made from the aggregated assets was to then be 
allocated to individual iwi, thus maintaining the efficiency of the system while still 
allowing individual iwi to benefit from their assets. AFL received half of the assets 
transferred to the Commission and all of the profit made by AFL was transferred back 
to the Commission to enable it to be allocated to iwi. However, after consultation with 
iwi, assets were to be transferred directly to iwi. Thus, at the completion of the   30
transition period specified in the Act, AFL was effectively dissolved and all assets 
were transferred back to the Commission. 
 
All quota held by the Commission was leased out on an annual basis with preference 
given to Maori fishers (Day 2004). Despite the creation of AFL, the Commission 
retained half of the awarded quota enabling it to be leased to individual fishers. Once 
AFL’s assets and quota were transferred back to the Commission, this additional 
quota was also leased out. 
 
4.5.1.2 Introduction of Rock Lobster into the QMS 
Within the Maori Fisheries Act 1989, legislation was introduced to complete the 
introduction of two rock lobster species (spiny rock lobster and the packhorse lobster) 
into the QMS as these species were partially entered into the system when the 
injunction was put in place. However, the introduction of these species was not part of 
the settlement of Maori treaty claims. For more information on the introduction of 
these two species into the QMS see Section 3.1.5.  
 
4.5.1.3 Taiapure 
As part of the Maori Fisheries Act 1989, provisions were made to allow for Maori 
management of estuarine and coastal areas that had customary significance to any iwi 
or hapu for either food or spiritual and cultural reasons. The creation of these areas, 
known as taiapure, was the first attempt to allow for non-commercial aspirations of 
Maori and to provide a mechanism through which local Maori could play an advisory 
role to the Ministry of Fisheries. Within the specified taiapure areas, a committee 
recommended by local Maori becomes responsible for managing the recreational and 
customary fishing. While this committee is unable to change the regulations 
applicable to the taiapure, they have the right to recommend to the Ministry that 
changes to regulations are made.
39 Thus, taiapure provide a system for local Maori to 
have input in the management of the customarily significant marine environments 
(Ministry of Fisheries 2006a). 
 
To create a taiapure, local tangata whenua must submit a proposal to the Ministry of 
Fisheries. This proposal must outline all the individuals who are likely to be affected 
by the taiapure, the species involved, the proposed management policies and 
objectives and the significance of the area to Maori (S177). If the proposal has the 
support of the Minister of Fisheries, an opportunity is provided for public submission 
on the proposal. The Minister is then able to make his final decision based on all the 
submissions that have been made and the recommendations from a judge of the Maori 
Land Court. Once a proposal has been accepted, the Minister is able to appoint a 
management committee based on the nominations provided by local Maori (Bess and 
Rallapudi 2006).  
 
Under Section 183 of the 1996 Fisheries Act, no individual can be refused access to 
the use of, or be required to leave, any taiapure based on their colour, race, ethnicity 
or national origins. This ensures that non-Maori would not be excluded from coastal 
                                                 
39 Until regulations are altered for this area, based on recommendations made by the management 
committee, the relevant fisheries regulations remain in place.   31
areas or discriminated against, but it has caused some conflict with Maori. Under 
early legislation, which has long been repealed, (the Maori Councils Acts of 1900 and 
1903 and the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act 1945) there was 
provision for exclusively Maori reserves to be set up (Waitangi Tribunal 1992a). This 
legislation was repealed in 1962 and until the Maori Fisheries Act 1989, there was no 
legislation allowing taiapure, or similar areas, to be created. So although the 1989 Act 
provided provision for Maori input into the management of culturally significant 
areas, it did not go as far as previous legislation which allowed for exclusive access 
(Waitangi Tribunal 1992a). The failure to secure exclusive access has been a 
disappointment for some Maori. Despite this, both Maori and non-Maori have been 
able to see the potential benefits of the taiapure system as it allows individual 
communities greater control over their local resources (Waitangi Tribunal 1992a, 
Option4 2006a).  
 
Currently eight taiapure have been established in New Zealand (Anderton 2006). The 
first of these was set up in 1995 at Palliser Bay on the South Wairarapa coast and 
subsequently taiapure have been established throughout the country. But since the late 
1990s, Maori have started to lose interest in establishing taiapure because of to the 
relatively lengthy legislative process involved in creating them when compared with 
establishing mätaitai (see Section 4.8.3.1 for more details on mätaitai) (Bess and 
Rallapudi 2006).  
 
While the Maori Fisheries Act 1989 started the process of settling Maori Treaty 
claims, it did not represent a full settlement and it led to a number of legal claims 
being filed. Thus, additional work was required before the issue was fully resolved. 
 
In August 1987, Ngai Tahu filed a fisheries claim against the Crown disputing the 
rights of the Crown to implement the QMS under the Treaty of Waitangi (Bess 2001). 
Ngai Tahu claimed full ownership of fisheries in their area and demanded 
compensation for the damage that had been done to their fisheries during the Crown’s 
stewardship. Their claim took a long time to process and,  in the meantime, the Maori 
Fisheries Act 1989 was passed. But in 1992, the Waitangi Tribunal produced its 
report on Ngai Tahu’s claims which supported the iwi’s right to ownership and their 
claim to a development right. (Waitangi Tribunal 1992a). This development right 
states that Maori have rights to the fish species that have been discovered and 
technology that has been developed since the signing of the Treaty in 1840. Despite 
this being found in the Muriwhenua claim, it was not until the Ngai Tahu report that 
the practical implications of this right were defined.
40 The Tribunal concluded that 
Ngai Tahu have the right to a reasonable share of the sea fisheries within twelve to 
two hundred miles offshore (Waitangi Tribunal 1992a). The acknowledgement of the 
development rights has ensured that Maori receive both inshore and deepwater quota 
as part of the Treaty settlement independent of whether a species was fished 
traditionally (Bess 2001). 
                                                 
40 In the Muriwhenua’s traditional area, all species that were covered by the QMS had traditionally 
been fished by the local Maori. Thus, there was no reason for the Muriwhenua report to assess the right 
of Maori to newly developed fisheries. But there are species that are fished within Ngai Tahu’s tribal 
area which were never fished traditionally such as the deep-water species. Therefore, whether the iwi 
should have access to these fisheries became an issue only once the Ngai Tahu claim was being 
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4.6 Final Settlement of Commercial Claims 
 
4.6.1 Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Act 1992 
While negotiations were taking place surrounding the Ngai Tahu claim, New 
Zealand’s largest seafood firm, Sealord Products Ltd., was offered for sale. This 
presented an opportunity to obtain the significant amount of quota required to settle 
Maori fishing claims. Negotiations took place between Maori and the Crown, which 
culminated in 1992 with a Deed of Settlement (Batstone and Sharp 1999). This Deed 
became the basis of the Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Act 1992 and provided a full 
settlement of all Maori commercial fisheries claims in accordance with the Treaty of 
Waitangi (Bess 2001).  
 
Under this settlement, Maori were given $150 million for a half share of Sealord 
Products Ltd and in addition to the quota that they already received under the 1989 
Act, they would receive 20 percent of all new QMS species when they were 
introduced into the system (Wallace 1998, Bess 2001, Newell 2004). It was stated in 
both the Deed of Settlement and the 1992 Act that these assets must be used to the 
benefit of all Maori despite the fact that they would eventually be allocated to 
individual iwi.  
 
The passing of this Act extinguished all rights of Maori to commercial fisheries no 
matter what system was being used to manage the species. However, because of the 
mechanism used to compensate Maori, they would not get direct benefits from a 
species unless they were introduced into the QMS. This was not important for the 
most significant commercial species (as they are all in the QMS) but it meant that 
direct compensation might not have been gained for other species such as freshwater 
species.  
 
The 1992 settlement did not have the support of all Maori. A Court of Appeal 
injunction against the 1992 Deed was attempted (Bess 2001) and an inquiry was 
carried out by the Waitangi Tribunal (Waitangi Tribunal 1992b). However, these 
appeals were unsuccessful and the objections from Maori towards the QMS are now 
largely resolved (Connor 2001a).  
 
4.7 Allocation of Commercial Assets 
 
Although the level of compensation for Maori was decided through the Treaty of 
Waitangi Settlement Act, the more difficult task of allocating this among Maori still 
needed to be resolved. After the Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Act 1992 was created, 
the Maori Fisheries Commission was restructured and  the Treaty of Waitangi 
Fisheries Commission or Te Ohu Kai Moana (TOKM) as it is otherwise known was 
formed (Bess 2001). TOKM was given ownership of both the pre-settlement assets 
(PRESA) awarded under the 1989 Maori Fisheries Act and the post-settlement assets 
(POSA) awarded under the 1992 Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Act. Not only is 
TOKM required to manage these assets on behalf of all Maori, they must also 
facilitate the allocation of these assets to iwi (TOKM 2002). When this allocation   33
takes place, TOKM must ensure that it is to the benefit of all Maori, not just those 
who affiliate with a particular iwi.  
 
Deciding on a fair allocation model took 12 years and involved extensive consultation 
with individual Maori, iwi and other interested parties (TOKM 2003). In November 
1998, TOKM had identified what it believed was the optimum method for allocating 
PRESA, but was unable to report this to the Minister because of unresolved litigation 
(TOKM 2001a). This proposal was subsequently revisited and a new allocation 
strategy was published as He Anga Mua in December 2001. Within this report, it was 
stated that PRESA and POSA would be allocated using the same allocation method, 
and four possible allocation methods were suggested (TOKM 2001b).
41 These 
methods varied in the extent to which the assets were held in a centralised 
organisation and on whether population and/or coastline were used to determine the 
allocation of assets to tribes. Extensive discussion was then carried out with iwi to get 
feedback on the options and to ensure that they understood the proposal.  
 
Following a review of the submissions received regarding He Anga Mua, TOKM 
reviewed its options and published a new proposal of a single allocation method in 
August 2002 as Ahu Whakamua (TOKM 2003).
42 This document was used to gain 
agreement from iwi and interested parties on the proposal (TOKM 2002). The final 
report to the Minister, He Kawai Amokuri, contained very slight alterations to Ahu 
Whakamua regarding how and when iwi would receive their allocation and was 
published in May 2003 (TOKM 2003).  
 
In 2004, the Maori Fisheries Act 2004 was passed, finalising the method to be used to 
allocate Maori fishing assets to iwi. The allocation method in the Act follows that 
which was presented in He Kawai Amokuri and outlines the process of allocation of 
quota, cash and other assets. A number of organisations were established to centrally 
manage assets on behalf of iwi and to promote Maori fishing.  
 
4.7.1 Key Organisations 
The Maori Fisheries Act 2004 established six distinct entities including the additional 
restructuring of TOKM. 
 
4.7.1.1 Te Ohu Kai Moana Trust  
The Te Ohu Kai Moana Trust governs the allocation and management of assets.  
 
4.7.1.2 Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustees Limited (TOKM) 
Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustees Limited (TOKM) administers the rules of the Te Ohu 
Kai Moana Trust and holds the assets until they are allocated. The Trustees also 
                                                 
41 Despite the decision to allocate the PRESA and POSA in the same manner, a key difference still 
remained. The PRESA quota are only able to be traded within Maori settlement groups (i.e. iwi and 
TOKM) while the POSA quota are able to be freely traded. While this restriction reduces the efficiency 
of the system, this effect is likely to be minimal due to the large number of iwi involved. The ACE that 
is generated from this quota though can be freely traded without restriction.  
42 See Section 4.7.2 for more details on the final allocation method.    34
manage Te Putea Whakatupu Trust, Te Wai Maori Trust and Aotearoa Fisheries 
Limited (TOKM 2006a).  
 
Setting up Te Ohu Kai Moana as a trust company has had distinct benefits. It ensures 
that individual trustees are not personally liable for the assets that are held by Te Ohu 
Kai Moana and it benefits from the efficiency of company law. The following trusts 
and companies are all administered by Te Ohu Kai Moana:  
 
4.7.1.3 Aotearoa Fisheries Limited (AFL)  
While TOKM was set up as the governance body for Maori fishery interests, Aotearoa 
Fisheries Limited (AFL) was re-established to control the commercial side of the 
assets (AFL 2006) and to provide an income stream for Maori. In this role, AFL 
fishes the quota held in central ownership by TOKM and aims to increase the total 
commercial assets (AFL 2006).
43 AFL currently holds around half the total value of 
Maori fishing assets and is estimated to be worth at least $350 million (TOKM 
2006b). AFL is entirely owned by TOKM who hold all of the voting shares but the 
profit that AFL generates is split two ways. Eighty percent of the income shares are 
held by iwi and the remaining twenty percent is held by TOKM.
44 
 
4.7.1.4 Te Putea Whakatupu Trust  
Te Putea Whakatupu Trust was established in March 2005 to promote the educational 
advancement of Maori, with a focus on fisheries related activities (TOKM 2005a). 
Prior to the creation of Te Putea Whakatupu Trust, the TOKM Charitable Trust had 
already distributed more than 2,000 education and training scholarships to Maori. Te 
Putea Whakatupu Trust will build on the success of TOKM’s scholarship programme 
(TOKM 2005b). It is through this trust that assets are used to help all Maori, including 
those who do not affiliate with a particular iwi.  
 
4.7.1.5 Te Wai Maori Trust  
The Te Wai Maori Trust uses its income to fund education and research related to 
Maori freshwater fishing. It also promotes the protection and enhancement of 
freshwater fisheries habitat, especially those that have traditionally supported iwi 
(TOKM 2005a). By carrying out research into freshwater species, it may be more 
likely that these species are introduced into the QMS, thus enabling  Maori to gain 
further financial benefits from the settlement deal. But there are also social and 
cultural benefits from the work carried out by this trust through the enhancement of 
the environment.  
 
4.7.1.6 Te Kawai Taumata 
Te Kawai Taumata was set up with the sole purpose of appointing and removing 
directors from Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustees Limited. There must be between 6 and 11 
                                                 
43 These assets include 50% shareholdings in Sealord and Prepared Foods Ltd and 100% ownership of 
Moana Pacific Fisheries, Chatham Processing, Pacific Marine Farms and Prepared Foods Processing.  
44 By retaining some of the revenue in a central organisation, the commitment to using the assets for the 
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people on the board, all of whom must be of Maori descent. These individuals are 
chosen by regional iwi groups in a manner which attempts to ensure that the best 
people are chosen for the task, rather than people who will try to advance the interests 
of large tribes.  
 
4.7.2 Allocation of Assets 
The Maori Fisheries Act 2004 outlined the process of allocation of the settlement 
assets given to Maori under the Maori Fisheries Act 1989 and the Treaty of Waitangi 
Settlement Act 1992.  
 
4.7.2.1 Quota 
Under the Maori Fisheries Act, deepwater and inshore quota are allocated through 
different methods. Deepwater quota are defined as fish stocks where at least 75% of 
the catch is caught at 300m or deeper and inshore quota is caught above 300m (S8-9 
Maori Fisheries Act 2004). If a fish stock is unable to be classified through this rule, 
then the fish stock is classed by TOKM based on the location of fishing, fishing 
equipment used and any other relevant information (Maori Fisheries Act 2004 S9). 
Inshore quota is allocated based on an iwi’s share of coastline within the relevant 
QMA so that iwi receive the same proportion of quota as their share of the QMA’s 
coastline (S140). The deepwater quota is allocated to iwi based 75% on an iwi’s 
population and 25% on its share of coastline within the QMA (S141). However, some 
exemptions and alternative allocation rules were also put in place to ensure that iwi 
were not disadvantaged. 
 
The quota for species in the Chatham Island zone is allocated to iwi slightly 
differently in recognition of the dependence of the Chatham Islands on fishing (S142) 
(TOKM 2003).
45 While the inshore quota in the Chatham Islands is still allocated 
based on the coastline, the deepwater quota is allocated based on 50% population and 
50% coastline. When the QMA of a species is only partially within the Chatham 
Island zone, the quota is divided into two portions so that some of  it is assigned under 
Chatham Island zone regulations while the remainder is assigned as regular quota.  
 
Due to the large amount of coastline that can be accumulated through the inclusion of 
harbours, special provisions have been made for dealing with these areas under 
Section 143 of the Act. This section defines the total amount of coastline able to be 
claimed within significant harbours. Schedule Two of the Maori Fisheries Act 2004 
identifies the amount of quota in each of the specified harbours that can be allocated 
to local iwi whose territory adjourns the harbour. The quota that is allocated through 
this provision is deducted from the total settlement quota before general allocation of 
inshore quota occurs. 
 
When quota is allocated for freshwater species, such as long-finned eels, only iwi 
whose territory is within the relevant QMA are eligible for quota. If a single iwi is 
located with the QMA, they receive the entire quota held by TOKM. When multiple 
                                                 
45 The Chatham Island zone is a special 200 nautical mile zone that was identified around the Chatham 
Islands for the purpose of quota allocation.    36
iwi are involved, the proportion of quota allocated to each can be based on  the 
population of each iwi group or by agreement across parties.  
 
4.7.2.2 Settlement Asset Money 
Under this Act, TOKM receives the settlement assets granted to Maori. However, 
under Section 137, it must transfer these assets to a number of entities (described 
above): Te Putea Whakatupu Trustee Limited receives $20 million, Te Wai Maori 
Trustee Limited receives $10 million, and Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustee Limited 
receives $5 million. Once this process is complete, TOKM must use its revenue from 
AFL to fund its activities. Additional money from the settlement process must also be 
transferred to iwi.
46 The proportion each iwi receives is determined by its size. The 
iwi also receive the cash that was earned by the Commission through leasing quota on 
the iwi’s behalf. 
 
Because some iwi are only entitled to a small amount of quota under the allocation 
scheme, they are will receive additional cash. Small allocations are inefficient to 
manage, so tribes with small allocations receive an additional $1 million to help with 
the management and to enable them to purchase more quota.  
 
Other tribes receive money instead of quota. When cash was received from the 
settlement deal in place of quota, the Commission retained this money in a separate 
trust, in order to secure the missing quota. Where the quota has not yet been 
purchased, the iwi that would have received this quota instead receives money from 
the Trust.  
 
4.7.2.3 Income Shares 
Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustee Limited must also allocate 80% of the income shares that 
it holds in Aotearoa Fisheries Limited. These shares are to be allocated based on iwi 
population size which are provided in the Third Schedule.  
 
Due to the potential for financial gain, much lobbying about the allocation mechanism 
took place before the Maori Fisheries Act 2004 was passed. But this lobbying did not 
prevent the model from going to Parliament (Day 2004) and once the Act was passed, 
no legal action was taken.  
 
4.7.3 Requirements to Receive Quota 
To receive quota, iwi must meet the criteria specified under Section 130 of the Maori 
Fisheries Act 2004. This criteria states that iwi must form a mandated iwi organisation 
(MIO) which will hold and manage the assets transferred to them on behalf of the iwi. 
The MIO must be set up as a company, trust or incorporated society whose directors, 
trustees or office holders have been elected or appointed in accordance with the 
organisation’s constitution. The organisation needs to maintain a current register of all 
iwi members, which must contain at least the number of people listed in the fourth 
column of Schedule Three of the Maori Fisheries Act 2004. Until iwi have formed an 
                                                 
46 This process involves a transfer of $20.7 million plus earnings to iwi.   37
approved MIO, the settlement assets that would be given to them are held in a trust 
and managed by TOKM.  
 
Until November 2004, it was not possible for iwi to form MIOs since the new TOKM, 
with whom they needed to register, had not yet been established. But many iwi had 
made significant progress before this time towards setting up their organisations 
(TOKM 2006c). So far, 34 MIO have been set up and approximately 60% of the value 
of the settlement assets has been allocated to individual iwi (TOKM 2006d).
47 TOKM 
is required to have completed the allocation of all assets to iwi by 2010 (TOKM 
2005a) but it is hoping to be able to complete this process by September 2007.   
 
4.8 Customary Rights 
 
In addition to commercial claims to fisheries resources, Maori also have customary 
rights which enable them to collect fish and seafood for events on Marae and for other 
traditional non-commercial uses. Food from the aquatic environment has played an 
important role in many cultural activities and constituted a large component of the 
traditional diet. Thus, there is a desire to ensure that this right is not extinguished. The 
Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992 recognised both the 
commercial and customary rights of Maori and consequently included provision for 
Maori customary use and input into the management of fisheries (Lawson et al. 
2006). Without accounting for customary non-commercial fishing, it is unlikely that 
many iwi would have supported the fisheries settlement (Ministry of Fisheries 2004a).  
 
4.8.1 Customary harvest allowance 
The Minister of Fisheries is required to make allowances for different fishing 
interests, including customary harvest, when allocating the TAC. The allowance made 
for customary fishing should, as a matter of policy, fully satisfy customary interests, 
and therefore the allowance should not constrain the level of customary catch taken. 
The customary fishing regulations (Fisheries (South Island Customary Fishing) 
Regulations 1999 and the Fisheries (Kaimoana Customary Fishing) Regulations 1998) 
do not provide for the Crown to place limitations on customary fishing, apart from 
ensuring the sustainability of a particular stock.
48   
 
In most cases, there is very little information on customary fishing take, although this 
will improve as customary regulations take effect and better reporting processes are 
implemented. In the meantime, the Ministry bases the customary allowance on a 
variable proportion of the recreational allowance, based on an assumed similarity 
between recreational and customary Maori interest in inshore stocks; the proportion 
applied depends on the importance of the species for customary use. By following this 
approach, the customary take is unlikely to exceed the allowance. However, 
information collected under the reporting requirements of the South Island Customary 
Fishing Regulations may be available for a large proportion of the South Island and 
                                                 
47 Many iwi are not able to receive all of their entitlement yet due to a lack of agreement between 
neighbouring tribes over boundaries. 
48 But given the highly similar nature of these two pieces of legislation, they are jointly referred to as 
the customary regulations (Option4 2006b).    38
could be used to estimate customary take. The Ministry will therefore use the 
reporting framework, and will work towards estimating catch for other parts of the 
country based on an estimation of the frequency of hui and tangi at each Marae within 
a given QMA. 
 
4.8.2 Regulation 27 
In 1986, regulations were passed that provided a mechanism through which fishers 
could be made exempt from amateur fishing regulations provided they met certain 
criteria and were taking fish for approved traditional non-commercial purposes 
(Regulation 27 and 27A of the Fisheries (Amateur Fishing) Regulations 1986). These 
regulations have been used to provide for customary harvest, thus allowing 
individuals to collect fish and seafood without being subject to amateur fishing 
regulations, provided they had permission from local Maori.  
 
However, this system caused confusion since a number of groups were able to claim 
tangata whenua status within an area and, consequently, authorise exemptions. Thus 
in 2003, substantial changes were made to the regulations to improve this process. For 
instance, potential fishers must acquire written permission from an authorised 
representative of the local tangata whenua,
49 all gear must be marked with an 
authorisation number and the sale or trade of any fish taken under this provision is 
prevented. The authorising representative may also choose to place further restrictions 
on the harvest such as limiting the time and place that fishing can take place. While 
this system enables Maori control over traditional areas, it still leaves room for 
interpretation about who is able to collect customary non-commercial fish. Thus, 
Regulation 27 is being replaced throughout the country with regulations for creating 
mätaitai (See Section 4.8.3.1 for more details). 
 
4.8.3 Maori Guardianship 
In order to assist in the management of their local fisheries, iwi need to appoint a 
representative who is able to liaise with Government officials and make decisions on 
their behalf. These individuals (Tangata Kaitiaki in the North Island and Tangata 
Tiaki in the South Island) are recommended by the local iwi that they represent, and 
provide a mechanism through which the tangata whenua have input into the 
management of their customary fishing areas.
50 Although these positions are 
voluntary and require a large amount of work, there were around 280 Tangata Kaitiaki 
and Tangata Tiaki in New Zealand in 2006 and more are expected to be appointed in 
the near future (Ministry of Fisheries 2006b).  
 
The Tangata Kaitiaki and Tangata Tiaki have substantial control over the use of the 
aquatic resources within their area. He or she can issue permits to allow the harvest of 
aquatic life for customary gatherings and can also put in place additional bylaws to 
                                                 
49 This permission must state: who can take the fish; how many fish of which species can be taken; the 
area the named parties are authorised to fish in; dates and times fishing can occur; and the purpose for, 
and place of, catching the fish.  
50 The Tangata Kaitiaki and Tangata Tiaki must be appointed by the Ministry, but these appointments 
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influence the use of the resource.
51 The authority of the Tangata Kaitiaki and Tangata 
Tiaki extends only within the area of their hapu or iwi.  
 
Tangata Kaitiaki and Tangata Tiaki are accountable to both their hapu or iwi and the 
Ministry. Tangata Kaitiaki and Tangata Tiaki are appointed by their hapu or iwi to 
represent the group. Consequently, they are required to meet with their hapu or iwi 
annually to inform the group of the customary fishing occurring within their area, 
restrictions that are in place and any other relevant information. They must also report 
to the Ministry of Fisheries every three months to provide information regarding the 
customary fishing that they are authorising. For this reporting to occur, extensive 
record keeping must be undertaken by the Tangata Kaitiaki and Tangata Tiaki. The 
information that they gather assists in assessing the sustainability of fish stocks. If 
Tangata Kaitiaki or Tangata Tiaki do not follow the wishes of their hapu or iwi, or 
their actions affect the sustainability of the resources that they are responsible for 
managing, then the Minister of Fisheries can instruct the Tangata Kaitiaki and 
Tangata Tiaki to comply or remove them from their role (Ministry of Fisheries 
2004a).  
 
4.8.3.1 Mätaitai Reserves 
In addition to permitting customary fishing in an area, a Tangata Kaitiaki or Tangata 
Tiaki may also apply to the Minister to have a mätaitai reserve established within their 
area under the customary regulations.
52 Mätaitai are reserves set up in traditional food 
gathering areas, thus enabling Maori to control fishing resources in these culturally 
significant areas.  
 
Applications for mätaitai reserves must be approved by the Minister if they meet all 
the legislative conditions outlined in the regulations. For instance, management aims 
which are consistent with the sustainable management of the resource must be 
created, a special relationship between tangata whenua and the area must be 
demonstrated and it must be shown that the proposed mätaitai will not affect the 
ability of quota holders to catch their ACE (Lawson et al. 2006).  
 
The placement of a mätaitai reserve can affect commercial fishing in the area, as 
commercial fishing is prohibited in these areas (recreational fishing is not affected). 
But the Tangata Kaitiaki or Tangata Tiaki can apply to the Minister to reinstate 
commercial fishing or alter the restrictions on recreational fishing as they see fit. 
 
The regulations governing the creation of mätaitai have replaced Regulation 27 over 
most of the country and will eventually replace it entirely. To date, only six mätaitai 
reserves have been created and cover just 136.8 km
2. However, there are eleven 
                                                 
51 These bylaws apply equally to Maori and non-Maori. However, there is one exemption to this. When 
a reserve is closed for general harvesting, the kaitiaki may still approve the collection of seafood to 
meet the needs of the local Marae (Seaweek 2006).  
52 Separate legislation was passed to enable the establishment of mätaitai reserves in the North and 
South Islands; Fisheries (Kaimoana Customary Fishing) Regulations 1998 for the North and Chatham 
Islands and Fisheries (South Island Customary Fishing) Regulations 1999 for the South Island. But 
given the highly similar nature of these two pieces of legislation (Option4 2006b), they are jointly 
referred to as the customary regulations. These pieces of legislation were drafted with extensive 
consultation with Maori and for those areas which are not yet covered by either regulation, consultation 
and debate continue (Bess 2001).   40
proposals currently being processed and, if all of these are successful, will cover an 
additional 880 km
2 (Bess and Rallapudi 2006).  
 
4.8.3.2 Rahui 
Traditionally, Maori have applied rahui (temporary bans on fishing activity) to areas 
in order to ensure that a resource is not exploited and the 1996 Fisheries Act provides 
provision for rahui to be put in place for two years.
53 Within these areas fishing is 
prohibited so that local fish stocks can recover from fishing pressure. 
 
Rahui may be requested by tangata whenua through their Tangata Kaitiaki or Tangata 
Tiaki (Seaweek 2006). On application, these closures can be extended for an 
additional two years, such as occurred in Pukerua Bay in 2004 (Ministry of Fisheries 
2006c). For more permanent closures, either taiapure or mätaitai are required (See 
Sections 4.5.1.3 and 4.8.3.1 for more details on taiapure and mätaitai respectively). 
Despite this limited time frame, many iwi have opted for rähui, as mätaitai do not 
allow for complete fish population recovery. 
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5. Recreational and Commercial Fishing 
 
Within any fisheries management system, sustainability cannot be guaranteed unless 
the effect of all fishing sectors is considered. In systems where only one or some of 
the fishing sectors are controlled by an ITQ based system, it is vital that the joint 
effects of all sectors on the fishery are considered to ensure sustainability. But 
aligning the management systems used for different fishing sectors can be challenging 
because of the differing objectives and mechanisms that are available in each system. 
In New Zealand, much of the conflict between customary and commercial fishing has 
been resolved, or processes have been established to make decisions on areas of 
conflicting interests.
54 However, issues surrounding the interaction between 
recreational and commercial fishing still need to be resolved including, potentially, 
the need to create additional mechanisms to facilitate this management interaction. 
 
Currently, identifying or directly controlling the level of recreational fishing in New 
Zealand is not possible. This chapter begins with a discussion of this issue before 
moving onto the interaction between recreational and commercial fishing sectors. 
Each year, the Minister has to determine the allocation of catch between the 
recreational and commercial sectors and this requires implicit decisions about the 
relative importance of each sector. The benefits of each sector are discussed briefly 
here before some of the issues surrounding the process of allocating catch between 
recreational and commercial fishing sectors are explained. Finally, recent attempts by 
the Ministry involving the recreational and commercial sectors are outlined, including 
the new Shared Fisheries Policy which is currently being developed.  
 
5.1 Lack of Information on Recreational Fishing 
 
Within the New Zealand system, the Minister of Fisheries is charged with ensuring 
the sustainable utilisation of fish stocks. This means that he must not only set total 
catch limits for each fish stock, but he must also allocate the total catch levels 
between customary, recreational and commercial fishing sectors. Under current 
policy, priority is given to ensuring that there is sufficient allowance for customary 
harvest (see Section 4.8.1). The remaining catch is then allocated between the 
commercial and recreational fishing sectors.
55 To be effective, the approximate 
harvest level of each sector is required.  
 
For the customary and commercial sectors, it is relatively simple to obtain 
information on catch levels due to the reporting that is required by individuals 
participating in the system. However, recreational fishers do not need to get a license 
to participate. Consequently, there is no compulsory, automatic reporting system to 
provide information on the location, species and amount of fish that recreational 
                                                 
54 See Chapter 4 for more details on customary fishing and indigenous treaty claims for fisheries 
resources.  
55 As outlined in Sections 2.4 and 2.5, the TACC levels are set based on the TAC with consideration 
given to the amount of fish caught non-commercially. But this does not imply that recreational fishing 
has priority over commercial fishing. The TACC and the allowance for recreational fishers are 
considered simultaneously.    42
fishers are catching. Instead, regulators must rely on voluntary surveys to provide 
estimates of recreational catch levels. These surveys have large differences in their 
estimates, even when the surveys are carried out a few years apart (Kearney 2002). 
 
With the underlying uncertainty regarding the estimates of recreational catch levels, it 
is difficult to determine whether recreational harvest levels are within the level 
identified by the Minister. This is not an issue from a sustainability viewpoint if the 
recreational harvest level is lower that the recreational harvest level identified by the 
Minister, but if the harvest level is above the allowance set the Minister, the 
sustainability of the fish stock may be compromised (Teirney et al. 1997).
56  
 
The Ministry of Fisheries is unable to directly manipulate the total level of 
recreational catch because this sector is regulated through input based controls such as 
daily catch limits and restrictions on fishing equipment and locations. So while the 
Ministry can reduce recreational fishing effort through the alteration of the 
regulations, quantifying the effect that these changes have is difficult. For example, 
reducing daily catch limits may decrease the recreational harvest in an area, but it is 
not clear by how much.
57  
 
Despite these difficulties, the Ministry must determine a way to share the harvest 
between sectors while maintaining sustainable fish stocks in the future and allowing 
the effective utilisation of the resource.  
 
5.2 Determining Sector Priority 
 
When fisheries resources are allocated between the recreational and commercial 
fishing sectors, decisions need to be made, at least implicitly, about each sector’s 
rank. As well as this, when TACs are reduced, decisions need to be made about which 
sectors should have their entitlement reduced and, if multiple sectors face reductions, 
by what proportion. In order to make these decisions, there needs to be a priority 
ranking between the different sectors. Based on current legislation, commercial, 
recreational and customary fishing are all considered simultaneously when TACC 
levels are set (See Chapter 2 for more details). However, while customary rights are 
considered to take priority because of the obligations set out in the Treaty of Waitangi 
(Ministry of Fisheries 2006d), the priority ranking between recreational and 
commercial fishing is not so clear (Sinner and Fenemor 2005).  
 
Both recreational and commercial fishing generate a number of benefits for society. 
The combination of monetary and non-monetary benefits associated with each sector 
makes it difficult to determine which group would generate the most value from 
additional fish or conversely from which would a reduction in catch allowance 
provide the lowest cost to society. 
 
                                                 
56 However, if the recreational catch is significantly lower than the recreational allowance, the 
allowance of the commercial sector could have been increased allowing greater utilisation of the 
resource without compromising sustainability. So there are economic consequences when the 
recreational catch levels are lower than the allowed catch levels. 
57 Many recreational fishers do not know the daily catch limits and this further limits the Government’s 
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5.2.1 Benefits of Recreational Fishing 
A significant number of New Zealanders from a wide range of ethnic and social 
backgrounds (Hawkey 1994) participate in recreational fishing each year (Gibbs and 
Stokes 2006). Recreational fishers get a variety of benefits from participating in this 
leisure activity. Not only are they able to provide fresh fish and shellfish for them and 
their families, but many also derive significant enjoyment and satisfaction from 
fishing. Because of the important role that recreational fishing plays in the life of 
many New Zealanders, it has significant cultural value. Consequently, many New 
Zealanders consider that being able to participate in recreational fishing is their 
birthright.  
 
In addition to the cultural significance, recreational fishing also has a number of 
economic benefits. There are a number of communities that rely on good fishing spots 
to attract visitors throughout New Zealand (Ministry of Fisheries 2006c). These 
visitors create jobs in retail, entertainment and service industries which may not have 
otherwise existed. Through these flow-on effects and direct expenditure on equipment 
and services, recreational fishing is thought to generate an annual expenditure of $973 
million for the 5 major recreational species alone (Option4 2000).  
 
5.2.2 Benefits of Commercial Fishing 
The commercial fishing sector provides substantial economic benefits for New 
Zealand and is a major export earner. For instance, in 2004, the commercial fishing 
industry generated $1.2 billion of export earnings. It also provides substantial 
employment. In 2004, it directly employed over 10,000 full time equivalent people 
and, it is estimated, that it indirectly employs another 15,000 full time equivalent 
people (Ministry of Fisheries 2006e). The economic benefits of the fishing industry 
are spread across the country; a number of small towns’ and communities’ economies 
are reliant on earnings from people involved in the industry.  
 
Balancing the monetary and non-monetary benefits of recreational and commercial 
fishing is challenging. Different groups within the fishing industry have their own 
views on which sector should take priority (Gibbs and Stokes 2006). While TOKM 
and commercial fishers believe that commercial fishing should receive priority over 
recreational fishing (TOKM 2000), groups representing recreational fishers believe 
that recreational fishing should have priority (e.g. Option4 2000). In 1989, Colin 
Moyle, the Minister of Fisheries at the time, stated that non-commercial fishing would 
receive priority over commercial fishing when a species was not able to support both 
sectors (Option4 2006c). This policy was not, however, ever formalised in legislation 
(Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 1999, p.66) and, 




5.2.3 Ministerial Discretion 
The responsibility for sharing the total catch between recreational, customary and 
commercial fishing rests with the Minister of Fisheries. While quota holders have 
rights to a proportion of the TACC under current legislation, the Minister is able to 
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use his discretion to determine what proportion of the TAC is allocated to commercial 
fishers each year (i.e. the level of the TACC) and the recreational fishing sector. 
While this enables the Minister to respond to new information regarding the 
sustainability of the fish stock, it also means that there can potentially be large 
changes in TACCs from year to year, making it difficult for the industry to plan for 
the future. This is especially pertinent when the Minister of Fisheries changes. A new 
Minister could have a different view of the relative importance of the recreational and 
commercial sectors than the previous minister, potentially causing significant changes 
in the amount of harvest allocated to each sector.  In practice, shares have not changed 
much year to year and most allocation decisions made following a TAC adjustment 
have been done proportionately. 
 
5.3 Legislative Management of Recreational and Commercial 
Fishing 
 
The interaction between the recreational and commercial fishing sectors provides a 
challenge for policy makers. Not only is a clear mechanism for allocating catch 
between these two groups necessary, but it is also important to ensure that a level of 
trust and cooperation between the two sectors is maintained. This is particularly 
difficult to achieve because both sectors have naturally conflicting objectives: they 
both want higher catch levels for themselves at the expense of the other sector. The 
legislation under the 1996 Act did not assist in encouraging cooperation between the 
recreational and commercial fishing sectors, but subsequent projects have focused on 
improving this relationship.  
 
5.3.1 1996 Fisheries Act regulations 
Under the 1996 Fisheries Act there is provision for areas to be put aside for non-
commercial fishing only.
59 Section 311 of the Act gives the Minister power to close 
areas to commercial fishing or to prohibit a commercial fishing method or methods 
for a particular stock in order to better provide for recreational fishing when 
commercial fishing has an adverse effect on recreational fishing.
60 However, by 
putting these restrictions in place there cannot be any conflict with customary fishing 
or the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.  
 
But Section 311 has rarely been used in practice. To date, only two marine ‘parks’ 
have been set up which are closed to commercial fishing, and with the support of 
locals, these areas also have restrictions in place on recreational fishing (Bess and 
Rallapudi 2006). The limited utilisation of this provision is likely to be due to the 
potentially large financial repercussions of putting a commercial fishing ban in place 
rather than a lack of public interest in commercial fishing free areas. Under this 
legislation, if there are large losses to the commercial sector, they may seek 
                                                 
59 This is in addition to the regulations providing for the creation of taiapure, mätaitai and rähui areas, 
which can also prevent commercial fishing in selected areas (See Sections 4.5.1.3, 4.8.3.1, 4.8.3.2 for 
more information on taiapure, mätaitai and rahui areas respectively). 
60 Improved recreational fishing can also be provided for by increasing the share of TAC which is 
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compensation for the non-commercial areas that are set up (Ministry of Fisheries 
2000).  
 
The inability to use current legislation and the increased conflict between different 
fishing sectors have led to further efforts to revise the methods available to manage 
recreational fishing and the interrelationship between different sectors.  
 
5.3.2 Soundings 
In 2000, Soundings was produced by the Ministry of Fisheries in conjunction with the 
New Zealand Recreational Fishing Council. It outlined three possible new methods 
for managing fisheries in order to address the issue of allocation between recreational 
and commercial fisheries (Ministry of Fisheries 2000). The first method retained the 
status quo for determining allocation between the two groups. Current legislation 
would be used and the Minister would continue to determine the allocation of fishing 
rights between the two groups. 
 
The second method used a fixed proportion to allocate harvest levels between the two 
groups. The Minister would set a TAC and the remaining catch (after allowing for 
customary harvest) would be split between recreational and commercial fishing based 
on pre-determined proportions. These proportions may have differed between fish 
stocks and may have varied over time. 
 
The final method focused on the use of recreational management, which would 
encourage cooperation with other sectors including Government and commercial 
fisheries. Under this system, it is likely that a proportional system would have been 
used to allocate fishing harvest between recreational and commercial fishing. 
Fisheries plans and recreational involvement in management were also encouraged 
under this proposal (See Section 8.2.1 for more details on fisheries plans). Inherent in 
all of the proposed methods was the idea that neither recreational nor commercial 
fisheries had priority over the other.  
 
The Soundings document received a number of mixed responses and led to the 
creation of a recreational fishing lobby group called Option4 (Ministry of Fisheries 
2006f).
61 Option4 strongly rejected all of the options outlined in the Soundings report 
and suggested instead that recreational fishing should have priority over commercial 
fishing because of its social, cultural and economic value to society. Submissions 
from Option4 members made up over 98% of the submissions on Soundings 
(Careering Options Limited 2001). But in addition to the large number of Option4 
submissions, there were also 939 other submissions from a range of individuals and 
groups. Most submitters agreed that the issues set out in the Soundings report were 
important, but varied in their opinion of the proposals. For example, a submission by 
TOKM wanted commercial fishing rights to take precedence over recreational fishing 
rights to maintain the value of the Treaty settlement. To do otherwise would break the 
agreement that was set in place when Maori fishing claims were settled (TOKM 
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to lobby the Government regarding recreational fishing rights. Option4 does not claim to represent all 
recreational fishers and cannot be confused with the New Zealand Recreational Fishing Council. 
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2000). In contrast, other individuals believed that the public’s right to collect fish and 
seafood for consumption should take priority.  
 
The first proposed method of retaining the status quo received the least amount of 
support in the submissions while the second method which advocated proportional 
share received the most. This suggested that people would like the system to be 
changed. However, there was not overwhelming support for one method in particular, 
so none of the proposed changes were made. 
 
In the three years following the Soundings report, two Ministerial consultative groups 
from the recreational sector were held (Ministry of Fisheries 2005a). These groups 
reached agreement on the objectives for recreational fisheries management, the need 
to revise spatial management tools and the development of an amateur fishing 
information strategy. However, despite this progress, no agreement could be reached 
on a method for allocating the TAC between recreational and commercial fishers. Due 
to this lack of agreement, the Minister of Fisheries abandoned the reform process in 
December 2003.  
 
5.3.3 Shared Fisheries Policy Development 
Although the review of recreational fishing issues was abandoned in 2003, the issues 
that prompted this review had not gone away. Many inshore fisheries were still facing 
competing demands from the commercial, recreational and customary sectors and 
resources were still being used to lobby the Minister and to take legal action, 
resources which could be better used for fisheries management and enhancement. It 
was clear that until these conflicting demands for access to fisheries were resolved, 
the management of fisheries would continue to be undermined and commercial 
investment limited. Thus, in late 2005, the Government announced a Shared Fisheries 
Project.  
 
The Shared Fisheries Project aims to improve the management of shared fisheries 
(Ministry of Fisheries 2006g).
62 Through the development of new policy, the Shared 
Fisheries Project will attempt to increase the value of shared fisheries, taking into 
consideration that the value of a fishery to New Zealand needs to include both its 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits to society (Ministry of Fisheries 2006h). 
 
Currently the Shared Fisheries Project is in the development phase, with a discussion 
document released in November 2006. So while the remainder of this chapter will 
outline the options presently being discussed, the format that the Shared Fisheries 
Policy will take when implemented may be quite different to what is outlined below. 
However, by including the options that are being considered, this report will provide 
both insight into the possible future of the system and also document options that are 
being considered at this time.  
 
The public discussion paper (Ministry of Fisheries 2006h) covers a range of issues 
and aspects of fisheries management, summarised below.  
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5.3.3.1 Improving information on catch and value 
As outlined above, while there is good information on the catch of the commercial 
fishing sector, information regarding recreational catch levels is limited. This needs to 
be improved with better survey procedures implemented. Special interest could be 
paid to the role of charter fishing boats as this may be a cost effective way of 
increasing knowledge about where recreational fishing occurs. Additional analysis 
may also take place to attempt to quantify the relative values of fish caught by the 
recreational and commercial fishing sectors allowing the maximum value to be 
achieved. 
 
5.3.3.2 Setting of TAC 
Currently, the TAC is set to manage stocks at a level that is able to provide the MSY, 
allowing the greatest amount of fish to be harvested at a sustainable level each year. 
However, while commercial fishers are interested in the amount of fish that they are 
able to catch, recreational fishers may prefer larger and/or more abundant fish. Thus, 
the Shared Fisheries Policy includes proposals to alter the way that the TAC is set and 
determining optimal rebuild times for depleted fisheries. If implemented, these would 
be applied on a case-by-case basis if they would lead to higher value being obtained 
from the fish stock.  
 
5.3.3.3 Prioritising TAC allocations 
To date, the Minister of Fisheries is able to determine the proportion of the TAC that 
is allocated to each of the three fishing sectors. However, this process is not 
transparent and provides little certainty for the future. Consequently, the Shared 
Fisheries Project aims to address this uncertainty by proposing that the rights of 
recreational fishers are protected with a guaranteed minimum tonnage for recreational 
fishing and the priority status that is currently given to customary fishing is 
formalised in legislation.  
 
5.3.3.4 Setting and Adjusting Recreational and Commercial Allocations 
Initial baseline allocation methods need to be identified for each of the fish stocks in 
order to determine how the TAC should be allocated between sectors, thus providing 
transparency and certainty for each of the sectors. Three mechanisms are identified in 
the discussion document for setting the baseline allocations.
63 First, allocations are 
identified by an independent panel or individual based on evidence and submissions. 
Second, allocations are identified based on a valuation study of the commercial and 
recreational sectors. Third, allocations are set after a negotiation process between 
representatives from the recreational and commercial sectors.  
 
Once allocations have been set, mechanisms need to be developed to establish how 
adjustments to the allocations will be made. In the long term, direct negotiation 
between the recreational and commercial sectors would be ideal, but given the current 
level of information and representation of these groups, this is not currently feasible. 
Instead, three mechanisms have been suggested. First, any adjustments that are made 
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to the TAC result in proportional adjustments to the existing allocations. Second, 
allocations are adjusted based on estimates of marginal value. Third, adjustments are 
made proportionally, but the adjustments take into consideration the valuation data in 
order to ensure that allocations lead to the greatest value from the fish stock. 
 
5.3.3.5 Management of Specific Local Areas 
While there are already tools for managing particular areas, such as mätaitai, 
providing additional mechanisms to manage fish stocks on a small scale may help to 
increase the value of shared fisheries. Three proposed additional management tools 
have been suggested. First, a coastal zone could be developed to allow for non-
commercial fishing only within an area. Second, sector representatives could 
introduce initiatives to protect specific areas such as multi-party agreements to limit 
catches or amateur fishing havens. Third, fisheries plans could be developed to cover 
all shared fisheries within an area (See Section 8.2 for more details on fisheries plans). 
 
5.3.3.6 Compensation for Industry 
If the any of the above proposed changes were put in place and, consequently, 
introduced significant costs for industry, compensation might need to be considered. 
This could occur through the existing method of leaving redress to the courts or else 
compensation could be identified through a cost and benefit approach identified by 
the Government. 
 
5.3.3.7 Recreational Fisher’s Participation in Management 
Due to the large role that recreational fishers have in shared fisheries, their 
involvement in the management of the fisheries is warranted. Thus, the Shared 
Fisheries Project proposes that an Amateur Fishing Trust be created to provide 
professional input from recreational fishers into fisheries management. This would 
provide effective input from the recreational fishing sector into fisheries management 
and work with the current amateur fishing organisations that are operating around the 
country. 
 
The consultation process and, subsequently, the implementation of the outcomes from 
the Shared Fisheries Project is likely to be a long process taking several years. Not 
only does this project require consultation with stakeholders, but any proposals which 
are recommended are likely to require further detailed development if they are to be 
put into place (Ministry of Fisheries 2006h).  
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6. Recovering Costs from the Industry 
 
The introduction of an ITQ based fisheries management scheme provides individuals 
with exclusive harvest rights to a fishery. This allows fishers to focus on providing the 
best fish for the market, thus resulting in better quality fish, lower costs and ultimately 
higher returns (Clement 2000). But there are both pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs 
associated with running the system. Not only are there costs associated with its 
management and enforcement, but there are also societal costs because of its 
exclusive nature. Consequently, regulators must decide whether the economic benefits 
that quota holders obtain through their exclusivity should be captured by the industry 
or paid to the Government. By allowing the industry to keep this rent, the industry can 
be recapitalised (Clark and Major 1988). However, since these individuals are 
obtaining a benefit from a previously common resource, perhaps they should, at least 
partially, fund the system that provides them with their benefits. In New Zealand, 
many quota holders received their quota without cost based on previous catch history. 
Thus, there may be an even stronger argument for ensuring that quota holders 
contribute to the cost of managing the QMS. 
 
Since the QMS was introduced, the New Zealand Government have wanted quota 
holders to contribute to the management costs associated with the system. However, 
the method for collecting funds from the industry has changed significantly in the last 
20 years. This chapter covers these changes from the use of a resource rental in 1986 
through to the current system where quota holders and fishers pay levies to fund all 
costs attributable to the commercial fishing industry. It also briefly discusses some of 
the conflict between the industry and the Ministry of Fisheries regarding the resource 
rentals and levies and concludes by outlining the settlement of under-recovery and 
over-recovery of costs in 2004.  
 
6.1 Resource Rentals 
 
When the QMS was first introduced, fishers of QMS stocks were required to pay a 
resource rental to the Crown for the use of the resource. This was designed to allow 
the Government to recover some of its costs associated with fisheries management. 
The resource rental was also used to prevent speculation in quota markets (Boyd and 
Dewees 1992, Sissenwine and Mace 1992). When the system was introduced there 
was concern that individuals would purchase quota as they expected the value of it to 
increase rather than to participate in the fishing industry. Therefore, in an attempt to 
prevent this from occurring and ensure that quota holders caught the fish that they 
were entitled to, resource rentals were charged on the amount of quota held rather 
than the amount of fish caught.
64  
 
The money that was collected from the resource rentals was to be placed into a 
specific revolving fund which would cover industry management costs, the financial 
cost of altering TACC levels and management related research (Batstone and Sharp 
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1999). It was even suggested that this fund might, in the future, pay a dividend to the 
Government (Crothers 1988). However, this fund was never established and rentals 
were paid straight into the Government’s consolidated fund.  
 
6.1.1 Initial Resource Rentals 
To maintain the industry’s support of the QMS, resource rentals were set low on 
introduction. For the majority of species, the resource rentals were initially set at $3 
per tonne of quota.
65 However, when foreign owned vessels were used, resource 
rentals were charged at a double rate to encourage the use of domestic vessels. When 
operations used both domestic and foreign owned vessels, the appropriate resource 
rental was paid based on the vessel that was used to catch the fish and all uncaught 
quota was charged at the domestic rate (Clark and Duncan 1986). 
 
6.1.2 Altering Resource Rentals  
Although resource rentals were introduced at low levels, the Government planned 
over time to increase the rentals so that the value of annual traded quota became zero 
(Clark and Duncan 1986).
66 Resource rentals were to be eventually set so that the 
economic profit from holding quota would be zero, or as close to zero as possible. 
Although it was difficult to determine the correct level of rentals to achieve this, 
economists suggested that the quota trade price reflected the economic profit gained 
from holding it. But the fishing industry disagreed, arguing that the quota prices at the 
start of the system were not a valid representation of the economic rent gained, 
especially since when the system was introduced a number of high value trades took 
place as individuals positioned themselves in the market place and sought quota to 
cover bycatch (Clark and Major 1988).  
 
The 1986 amendment (which introduced the QMS) provided for substantial 
movement in the level of resource rentals from year to year, allowing for an increase 
from the original low level. Under this amendment, as long as the Minister considered 
the value of quota, the impact on net commercial returns and the relevant changes in 
the TACC, he was able to alter the resource rental rate up to 20% per year (S107G of 
the amended Fisheries Act 1983). However, since the legislation was drafted listing 
fixed resource rentals in a Schedule without an adjustment formula, altering resource 
rentals required an amendment to the fisheries legislation (Sinner and Fenemor 2005). 
This provided the fishing industry with the opportunity to contest each decision to 
increase resource rental rates.  
 
In 1990, resource rentals were used as a bargaining tool to retain industry support. At 
this time, the Government was facing a large financial cost of reducing the TAC in the 
orange roughy fishery. To avoid this, quota was redefined as a proportion of the 
TACC (See Section 3.2.2 for more details). As compensation to the industry, the 
Government agreed to freeze the resource rental rates for five years and redistribute 
resource rental income to the industry (Sissenwine and Mace 1992).  
                                                 
65 However, the species that were individually listed on Schedule 1B of the Act had higher resource 
rental levels. For example, resource rentals for hoki and orange roughy were set at $8.25 and $100 
respectively.  
66 Fishers were informed of this intention prior to the system’s introduction (Ministry of Agriculture 
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From the beginning of the QMS, there was doubt about the legality and practicality of 
the resource rental scheme (e.g. Clark and Major 1988). The fishing industry was 
never convinced that the Government was entitled to benefits from holding quota. 
They argued that some of the benefits obtained from the quota holdings were due to 
earlier investments made by the fishing industry. Thus, they should be entitled to 
retain at least some of the benefits (Hawkey 1994). There was also doubt about the 
legitimacy of the Government charging rent for the use of something that it did not 
own. This doubt was not only expressed by the fishing industry but also within 
Government itself by MAF (Sinner and Fenemor 2005).  
 
Once Maori began to claim ownership of New Zealand’s fisheries under the Treaty of 
Waitangi, the ability of the Government to claim rentals was further put in doubt, 
especially when quota were given to Maori as part of the settlement package (Sinner 
and Fenemor 2005). Thus in 1994, with the passing of the Fisheries Amendment Act 
1994, resource rentals were replaced with cost recovery levies. 
 
6.2 Cost Recovery 
 
Cost recovery enables the Crown to recoup some of the costs associated with 
managing commercial fisheries.
67 When the system was introduced, the Crown and 
the fishing industry had different views regarding what costs should be able to be 
recovered. The Ministry of Fisheries wished to recover costs that would be avoidable 
if the commercial fishery did not exist. In contrast, the industry wanted to pay only for 
the costs that were attributed to the industry itself. While these were similar concepts, 
there were subtle differences between the two. In particular, under the industry’s 
definition, it was required to pay lower costs. However, the Ministry proceeded with 
the attributable costs approach and, as a result of this, many of the services that the 
Ministry of Fisheries carries out are not funded by the commercial industry despite 
the benefit that it may receive. For example, the industry is not required to fund the 
Ministry’s preparation of advice to the Minister on sustainability although they 
directly benefit. Instead, the Government funds this, along with any other joint costs 
between commercial and non-commercial fishing (Batstone and Sharp 1999). 
 
The cost recovery levies were set by the Minister with considerable flexibility. Under 
Section 107EA of the amended 1983 Fisheries Act, cost recovery could be used to 
recover the costs associated with management, enforcement, research, conservation 
services and other matters that are related to fishing and are in the spirit of the Act. 
Levies could be charged to any group of individuals within the fishing industry such 
as quota holders, fishing permit holders, vessel owners and licensed fish receivers at 
the Minister’s discretion.  
 
Failure to pay the cost recovery levy could lead to significant consequences for the 
individual. If cost recovery levies were not paid within two months of the due date, 
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the individual’s fishing permit was suspended preventing them from fishing (Section 
107L of the amended Act). When individuals hold multiple fishing permits, the 
Director-General could suspend as many of them as they deemed appropriate. 
 
6.2.1 Fisheries Act 1996 
The Fisheries Act 1996 maintained the spirit of the 1994 amendment. Costs were still 
recovered for both fisheries and conservation services and from a range of different 
types of industry participants (S262). However, there were some small changes under 
this new Act, including the revision of the Second Schedule of the 1983 Act. Cost 
recovery levies were outlined in the Tenth Schedule of the 1996 Act and in many 
cases the levies were altered and/or the species for which levies were applicable were 
changed. These changes included removing the higher costs associated with the use of 
foreign owned vessels and introducing levies on aquaculture. One of the most 
significant changes that occurred was that the Conservation Minister under the 1996 
Act set the total conservation levy that was to be paid by the commercial fishing 
industry. The Minister of Fisheries was then required to identify how much each 
sector of the fishing industry would pay; previously, the Minister of Fisheries had also 
set the total conservation levy.  
 
6.2.1.1 Research costs 
Since the 1996 Fisheries Act, non-core fisheries services have been contracted out by 
the Ministry of Fisheries. This includes the tendering of research services, which 
started in 1997 (Batstone and Sharp 1999).
68 While the Ministry of Fisheries initially 
funds this research, much of the cost associated with it is recovered from the 
commercial fishing sector through the cost recovery programme. The proportion of 
research costs related to a given fish stock recovered from the commercial fishing 
sector depends on the proportion of the total catch that was captured by the 
commercial fishing sector. 
 
Since quota holders were being charged for the research carried out, there was more 
reason for quota holders to take an interest, especially as research costs constituted the 
largest item in the cost recovery levies (Stevens 2005). The fishing industry also 
realised the impact that the research has on future TACC levels and ultimately the 
profitability of the industry. This has lead to some companies directly purchasing 
research in addition to the research that is funded by the levies to the Ministry. For 
example, the Orange Roughy Management Company invested in their own research, 
as well as through funding research by Government levies (Clement 2000). They 
directly commissioned research in a number of areas including stock assessments, 
environmental studies and age and growth studies.  
 
However, there has always been conflict surrounding the role of industry in funding 
research. Environmental organisations worry about the conflict of interest that could 
be occurring, suggesting that the industry is influencing the type of research that is 
taking place and indirectly censoring the findings (e.g. Wallace 1998). But within the 
fishing industry there are also concerns; some members of the industry suggest that 
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the return on the investment in fisheries research may not be worth the money spent. 
Investments could be better targeted to get more value for money (Stevens 2005). 
 
6.2.1.2 Under-recovery and over-recovery of costs 
The 1996 Fisheries Act introduced further items for consideration by the Minister 
when setting cost recovery levies. Section 265 states that when the Minister is setting 
cost recovery levies, he must not only consider the cost of the service that the levy is 
meant to be financing, but he must also consider cost recovery in previous years. Cost 
recovery levies were based on budgets that were generated prior to the start of the 
fishing season and, therefore, did not reflect the actual costs for that year. This meant 
that fishers in some fish stocks were paying more than was required and others were 
paying less. However, the 1996 Fisheries Act ensured that the Minister considered the 
difference between what was paid and what was actually required in previous years.  
 
6.2.2 Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Act 1999 
The Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Act 1999 enabled substantial improvements to be 
made on the earlier cost recovery regime by clearly defining who was paying for what 
services while still providing enough flexibility to allow for variation in the amounts 
that were recovered from the industry (Wyatt 2000). Section 262 of the amended Act 
clearly defines whether or not a cost can be recovered. This amendment has meant 
that the fisheries and conservation services can have their costs recovered or not 
according to the following: 
•  If a service is requested by an individual they must pay a fee for the service. 
•  Services provided in the public interest cannot have their costs recovered. 
•  Costs of services that are provided to manage the harvesting or farming of 
fisheries resources are to be attributed, where possible, to the individuals who 
benefit from the resource. 
•  Costs of services provided to protect the aquatic environment or biological 
diversity are to be attributed, where possible, to the individuals who caused the 
risk or adverse effect. 
•  Costs cannot be recovered by the Government for services that are provided 
by another organisation if the organisation was delegated responsibility for the 
service. However, the delegated organisation is able to set its own fees for 
these services. 
A new subsection was introduced into the Act, which made it explicit that the 
Minister did not need to consider the level of deemed values in an industry when he 
was recommending the implementation of an additional levy (S266 (3)).  
 
6.2.3 Fisheries Amendment Act 2004 
Despite the increased clarity provided by the 1999 amendment, tension arose between 
the Government and industry regarding the under-recovery and over-recovery of 
fishing and conservation service costs. To resolve this dispute, a $25 million dollar 
settlement was negotiated and this was passed as the Fisheries Amendment Act 2004. 
This amendment updates the obligations of the Ministry regarding under- and over-
recovery of costs, addressing the payment discrepancies covering the period from 
October 1994 (when cost recovery levies were introduced) to September 2002.   54
Although the amendment was passed to address concerns about the past, it has altered 
the way that the cost recovery levies have been set since October 2003.  
 
The 2004 amendment identified the amount that quota holders in each fish stock are 
entitled to be credited or are required to pay back to the Government (Schedule 9A). 
Starting in the fishing year commencing on 1 October 2003, the earlier discrepancies 
were addressed. For stocks that were listed in Part A of Schedule 9A, the amount 
identified in the schedule was credited against the levies payable for the 2003 fishing 
year. If the amount owed was greater than the levies, the remaining balance was to be 
credited in the subsequent fishing years until the settlement sum reached zero. For 
stocks that were listed in Part B of Schedule 9A that owed money, the levies for the 
2003 fishing year were increased by the amount listed. Thus, the discrepancies 
surrounding earlier payments were settled. 
 
While this process settled the claims that industry had on earlier cost recovery levies, 
it also created a number of aggrieved individuals. Historical overpayment of cost 
recovery levies was addressed by crediting present quota holders. But the individuals 
currently holding quota in each fish stock may not have held quota in the past. Thus, 
the individuals who received compensation through this settlement were not 
necessarily those who paid the higher than required cost recovery levies. Those 
individuals who sold their quota prior to the 2004 settlement received no 
compensation.  
 
6.2.4 Fisheries Amendment Act (No. 3) 2004  
In the Fisheries Amendment Act 2004, all compensation awarded to quota holders of 
spiny dogfish quota was allocated to the quota holders in a single stock. However, the 
Fisheries Amendment Act (No. 3) 2004 reallocated the compensation to this fishery 
amongst all spiny dogfish fish stocks.    55
7. Catch Balancing 
 
While ITQ based systems focus on individual species management, many species are 
caught simultaneously. Individual fishers can target multiple species at once while in 
other cases a different species may be captured unintentionally. So within this type of 
system, mechanisms must be established that allow fishers to deal with either excess 
catch of species for which they hold quota or the unintentional catch of species for 
which they do not hold quota. But these mechanisms need to be carefully designed so 
that they do not encourage over fishing and lead to the TACC being exceeded and, 
therefore, prevent sustainability goals from being achieved.
69 So a balance needs to be 
reached where fishers have access to mechanisms through which they can cover 
unintentional catch, but which do not encourage them to intentionally exceed their 
fishing entitlements. In the New Zealand system, a number of different catch 
balancing mechanisms have been used and at times fishers have had a number of 
options available to them. This chapter outlines the most common mechanisms and 
how the mechanisms available have changed over time.  
 
This chapter chronologically outlines changes that have occurred in the catch 
balancing mechanisms available to fishers. A large number of mechanisms were 
available in the QMS initially, but then, in 2001, the system was simplified to using a 
deemed values system and allowing a small amount of quota to be transferred from 
one fishing year to the next. This chapter, therefore, discusses, the most significant 
and commonly used mechanisms found in the system prior to 2001 and the post-2001 
bycatch mechanisms. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of regulations 
that are used to reduce the risk of the TACC being exceeded.  
 
7.1 Catch Balancing 1986-2001 
 
Under the 1983 Fisheries Act, it was illegal to catch fish without holding the relevant 
quota first. There was, however, a defence available to commercial fishers under 
Section 105A of the amended 1983 Fisheries Act.
70 If fishers were able to prove that 
they did not intend to take the fish, that the fish were caught as an inevitable 
consequence of lawfully taking other fish and the said fish were returned to the sea or 
surrendered to the Crown, they were able to defend themselves against any 
proceedings lodged against them.
71 However, in addition to proving that it was an 
inevitable consequence, the fisher had to balance the fish that they caught with one of 
a number of mechanisms. These mechanisms were needed to ensure that fishers had 
an incentive to retain any additional fish that they caught rather than dumping the 
extra fish into the ocean and not reporting this catch. However, these mechanisms also 
                                                 
69 Another related issue is that of highgrading whereby fishers discard lower quality fish so that they do 
not contribute to their quota allocation. This ensures that they have the highest quality, most profitable 
fish to sell. Highgrading, is, however, illegal in the New Zealand system under Section 72 of the 1996 
Fisheries Act (or previously Section 28ZB of the 1983 Fisheries Act).  
70 This amendment was introduced by Section 50 of the Fisheries Amendment Act 1990. 
71 Some species were unable to be returned to the sea by Section 28ZB(1) of the amended 1983 
Fisheries Act and, thus, needed to be surrendered to the Crown for this defence to be utilised.   56
had to ensure that there was little or no profit from catching additional fish so that  the 
level of bycatch and overfishing would be reduced. 
 
Five such mechanisms are discussed in detail in the following section. 
 
7.1.1 Surrender Catch  
The initial method that was set up to prevent overfishing involved fishers surrendering 
all fish that were caught without quota to the Government (Sissenwine and Mace 
1992). Fishers could still potentially benefit financially from landing their extra fish 
(Falloon 1993). Those fishers who caught fish in addition to their quota were required 
to give their extra fish to a processor. The processor then had to pay the Government 
the pre-determined price for all surrendered fish. However, if the price set by the 
Government was below the market price for the species, the processor gave the 
difference to the fisher, providing some monetary benefit from landing.  
 
7.1.2 Leasing or Buying Additional Quota  
The simplest way of balancing what was caught with the quota held was to lease the 
extra quota required to equate the actual catch and entitlement once in port. With the 
ability to trade quota and lease it for the short term, fishers were able to increase their 
entitlement to catch certain species by leasing quota and were able to lease out quota 
that they did not catch.  
 
In the early stages of the QMS, it was also possible to fish on behalf of another person 
who owned quota. This provided distinct benefits as the formal transfer of quota, 
either through leasing or through selling the quota, was not required. This was likely 
to have been popular amongst the smaller quota owners.  
 
7.1.3 Borrowing and Banking 
Within the QMS, there was provision to transfer a small amount of quota between 
fishing seasons. Under Section 28V of the amended 1983 Fisheries Act, quota holders 
could catch up to 10 percent more than the amount of fish that they were entitled to, 
given their quota holdings. However, when this occurred, the quota holder’s catch 
entitlement in the following fishing season would be reduced by an equivalent value. 
In addition, when quota holders caught less than their entitlement, they could transfer 
the uncaught component to the following season, to a maximum of 10 percent of their 
quota holding entitlement.  
 
7.1.4 Bycatch Trade-Off System 
Under the Bycatch Trade-Off System, fishers could trade quota of one species for 
another according to specified ratios set by the Ministry of Fisheries (Falloon 1993). 
The trade-off ratios set were based on the relative values of the two species (Peacey 
2002) and were limited to only a few species (Sanchirico et al. 2006). This system 
was mainly used by small fishing operations who had difficulty in acquiring the quota 
that they required (Peacey 2002).  
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However, this system was biologically unsound as it made it difficult to establish and 
enforce TACs. By allowing the trade of quota from one species to another it was not 
possible to control the total amount of fish caught within each species in the bycatch 
trade-off system. Consequently, the TACs of some species may have been exceeded 
while the TACs of other species may not have been reached. Since TAC levels are set 
to achieve the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY; See Chapter 2 for more details), 
any deviation from the TAC may threaten the sustainability of the fish stock or reduce 
the efficient use of the stock.  
 
7.1.5 Deemed Values 
Deemed values were a financial penalty that fishers had to pay for catching fish 
without the relevant quota holdings.
72 The Fisheries Amendment Act 1990 required 
that all commercial fishers pay the deemed value on all excess or unauthorised quota 
fish. The deemed values rate for each fish stock was determined prior to the start of 
each fishing season by the Minister and was paid per kilogram of extra fish caught. In 
setting the deemed value rates, the Minister was required to consider the market value 
of the fish, any other benefits the fisher may receive from the fish, and ensure that the 
price would encourage the fishers to land the catch without encouraging further 
harvesting (Section 28ZE of the amended 1983 Fisheries Act).  
 
Fishers were required to pay the deemed value amounts monthly for any excess fish 
caught (Peacey 2002). But they could have the money paid for the deemed values 
returned to them if they subsequently acquired the quota required to cover their excess 
catch through either leasing or buying the relevant quota. 
 
7.2 Catch Balancing after 2001 
 
Under the pre-2001 catch balancing system, fishers could choose the mechanism that 
gave them the best financial reward. While the five most notable catch balancing 
systems were outlined above, other mechanisms were also available. The system 
became more and more complex with around 20 different catch balancing 
mechanisms possible by 2001 (Peacey 2002). Not only was the system becoming 
complicated, but mechanisms such as bycatch trading and the surrendering of catch 
meant that there was potential for TACs to be exceeded.
73 
 
Substantial changes were made to simplify the catch balancing system when the 
Fisheries Amendment Act 2001 was passed. These changes coincided with the 
introduction of the ACE into the system.
74  
 
One of the most significant differences under the new system was that it was no 
longer illegal to catch species that were managed under the QMS without holding 
quota as long as you held a fishing permit (Newell 2004).
75 However, an individual’s 
                                                 
72 This system for managing bycatch is unique to New Zealand (Sanchirico et al. 2006). 
73 This potential for exceeding TACCs was exasperated by the difficulty in successfully prosecuting 
individuals breaching their ITQ except when the offence was blatant (Peacey 2002). 
74 See Section 3.2.3 for more information on ACE and its introduction into the QMS. 
75 However, there are minimum holding levels applying in some species. See Section 3.6.2 for more 
information on minimum holding levels.   58
failure to balance their catch would lead to the loss of their fishing permit, making it 
illegal for them to continue fishing for any species (Section 79 of the 1996 Fisheries 
Act).  
 
Under this new system, fishers have only two options to deal with their extra catch: 
they must either purchase the extra ACE required or pay the relevant deemed value. 
But this change was not just a simplification of the earlier system through the removal 
of other catch balancing mechanisms. With the passing of the Fisheries Amendment 
Act 2001, the deemed value system was also altered to include increasing penalties as 




7.2.1 Deemed Values 
Previously, the Minister was required to set the deemed value rates at such a level to 
ensure that there was an incentive for fishers to land fish, but without providing any 
added incentive for them to take additional fish. This was difficult to judge especially 
because of the different cost structures of firms.
77 Under the new system this joint 
requirement is removed stating that the Minister must 
 
“…  take into account the need to provide an incentive for every 
commercial fisher to acquire or maintain sufficient annual catch 
entitlement in respect of each fishing year that is not less than the total 
catch of that stock taken by that commercial fisher” (Section 75(2)(a)) 
 
The Minister is no longer required to set deemed values to ensure that there is no 
incentive for fishers to catch excess fish. Under Section 75(2), the Minister may have 
regard to the desirability of encouraging fishers to land catch for which they do not 
have ACE. The legal requirement to land all fish prevents, at least in theory, fishers 
dumping fish over the side rather than landing them (Section 72 of the 1996 Fisheries 
Act).
78 So, under the new system, deemed values are used to encourage commercial 
fishers to cover their catch by holding the relevant ACE and deterring dumping of fish 
is provided for by criminal sanctions (Ministry of Fisheries 2004b).  
 
The new deemed value system has two parts, a refundable interim deemed value 
which is paid at the end of every month and a non-refundable annual deemed value 
which is payable at the end of the fishing year (Peacey 2002). The monthly deemed 
value is set at a lower rate than the annual deemed value rate and is used as a reminder 
to fishers that they will have to settle their catch at the end of the year.  
 
At the end of each fishing season, FishServe calculates the deemed values payments 
based on the annual deemed value rate for all individuals who either own ACE or 
have reported catch (FishServe 2006b). The amount that has been paid through the 
monthly deemed value will then be credited against an individual’s annual deemed 
                                                 
76 For more details on FishServe see Section 3.2.3. 
77 Due to the differing costs, some companies may be encouraged to undertake more fishing than their 
quota entitles them to, while others may not find it worthwhile landing their excess catch at a given 
deemed values rate. 
78 But there are exceptions to this. Species that are listed on the Sixth Schedule can be legally returned 
to the sea and fish that do not meet minimum size requirements can also be returned.   59
values charges and all individuals will be notified of the remaining amount that they 
owe. If individuals have paid more in the monthly deemed values than they are 
required to pay in annual deemed values, the difference will be refunded to them.
79 
Failure to pay the deemed values within 20 days of the demand leads to the 
suspension of the fisher’s fishing permit which prevents them from legally continuing 
to fish (Section 79 of the 1996 Fisheries Act).
80  
 
Under the earlier deemed values system, all fishers were treated as if they valued 
excess catch or bycatch the same and that this level was linked directly to the market 
value. But while excess catch is likely to be closely related to the market value of the 
fish, the value of a species taken as bycatch to a fisher is only partially related to its 
market value. For bycatch fish, the value of the fish is more closely related to the 
added benefits of being able to catch the additional species. For example, mackerel 
fishers use the deemed values system to cover the kingfish that they catch as bycatch. 
Due to the low ratio of kingfish to mackerel within the catch, these fishers are willing 
to pay much more than the market value of kingfish to purchase kingfish ACE or to 
be able to cover their catch via the deemed values system as it allows them to capture 
mackerel more efficiently (pers. comm. David O’Dea).  
 
This is a difficult problem to address but differential annual deemed values 
(sometimes referred to as ‘ramping’) are now being used in some species to address 
the issue of differential valuing of bycatch. Under the differential deemed value 
system, the deemed value rate that the fisher must pay depends on the percentage of 
their ACE by which they overfished (FishServe 2006b). Therefore, it provides a 
graduated disincentive to overcatch, a disincentive which increases the more a fisher 
harvests in excess of his ACE. In a fish stock where the differential deemed value 
system is applied in the standard fashion, fishers must pay the standard deemed value 
rate for the first 20% of catch taken in excess of their ACE; for the next 20% of their 
catch by which they overfish they must pay 120% of the standard deemed value rate, 
and so on. This continues until the fisher is paying 200% of the standard deemed 
values rate for all additional catch 100% greater than their ACE entitlement.
81 There 
is flexibility in the legislation regarding the levels at which the deemed value amount 
increases so that the schedule can be adjusted to meet the needs of individual 
fisheries. But to date, this flexibility has never been used and in all species where the 
differential deemed values are used, the above thresholds apply (Newell 2004).  
 
The differential deemed value system is only used in selected species based on the 
incentives that the Ministry wants to create for fishers (Ministry of Fisheries 2001). In 
high value, single species fisheries, there are strong incentives for people to catch 
more than their quota due to the profitable nature of the species. Thus, it is important 
to discourage taking of catch in excess of ACE holdings. In these situations, the 
graduated deemed values system is very useful as the larger the excess catch, in 
proportion to the ACE holdings, the higher the deemed value payments per unit will 
become, hence discouraging additional catch. 
 
                                                 
79 This refund of the deemed value payments will only occur if an individual acquires ACE to cover 
some or all of their excess catch during the fishing season. 
80 This only applies if the outstanding deemed value payment is greater than $1,000.  
81 If a fisher holds no ACE for a species on which differential deemed values apply, then all deemed 
values are charged at the highest rate (usually 200% of the annual deemed value).    60
7.2.1.1 Chatham Island Deemed Value Rates 
Prices that are received by fishermen who land their catch in the Chatham Islands are 
significantly lower than those received by fishermen who land their catch on the 
mainland. Thus, if fishermen were forced to pay the same deemed values irrelevant of 
where they landed their fish, Chatham Island fishers would be severely disadvantaged 
and this would restrict the development of Chatham Island fisheries. To prevent this 
from occurring, separate, lower deemed values are used for fishermen who land their 
catch in the Chatham Islands.  
 
However, fishers do not automatically have Chatham Island deemed values applied 
(FishServe 2006b). To qualify for the lower rate, fishers must complete the relevant 
paperwork and get acceptance from FishServe prior to landing their fish. It is not 
possible to apply the Chatham Island deemed value rates to fish that are landed prior 
to gaining approval. Due to the potential financial benefits of landing fish on the 
mainland while paying Chatham Island deemed value rates, FishServe is required to 
check reported Chatham Island landings.  
 
In 2003, a private company, FishTech, was set up to minimise the deemed values that 
its members were required to pay through the transfer of ACE between the members. 
For details on this system see Section 3.5.3. 
 
7.2.2 Banking Quota 
ACE that is not caught in the current fishing year may be transferred to the 
subsequent fishing year. Under Section 67A of the 1996 Fisheries Act, if FishServe 
identifies that an individual has caught less than their ACE holdings, up to 10% of the 
individual’s ACE holdings may be transferred to the next fishing year. The ACE that 
is being transferred to the following season will be allocated as soon as is practical 
after the 15
th day following the end of the first fishing year.  
 
Allowing ACE to be transferred from one fishing season to another may enable 
TACCs to be exceeded by up to 10% in any fishing season. This makes planning 
difficult as a high catch in one season may reduce the population size in the 
subsequent fishing years. To avoid these fluctuations in vulnerable species, 
restrictions are put in place to prevent the transfer of ACE from one fishing year to 
another. ACE pertaining to fish stocks listed in Schedule 5A of the Fisheries Act 1996 
cannot be transferred from year to year, thus protecting these species from large 
annual fluctuations and allowing for better management of the resource. In addition, 
ACE cannot be transferred when the TACC is reduced in the subsequent fishing year.  
 
7.3 Over-Fishing Thresholds and Tolerance Limits
82 
 
While the deemed values system is in place to prevent over-fishing, it does not 
impose limits on how much fishing may occur as long as the individual is willing to 
pay the relevant deemed value. If deemed values are not imposing a sufficient 
economic disincentive, this could lead to fishing levels that significantly exceed the 
                                                 
82 These were introduced in the Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Act 1999 creating Sections 77 and 78 
of the 1996 Fisheries Act.   61
TACs. To prevent this from occurring, over-fishing thresholds have been put in place 
in some stocks to restrict the amount by which fishers can exceed their ACE holdings. 
Over-fishing thresholds identify a percentage of catch entitlement by which an ACE 
holder can exceed their ACE holdings. If this value is exceeded, then fishers will no 
longer be able to harvest any fish, aquatic life or seaweed in the QMA where the 
threshold was exceeded. This prohibition will remain in place until either the 
individual has obtained enough quota to cover their catch or the end of the fishing 
year.  
 
However, this system causes problems for small quota holders who are at a much 
higher risk of exceeding their over-fishing threshold. To ensure that the individuals 
with small quota holdings are able to exceed their ACE by a small amount without 
suffering from permit prohibitions, threshold levels (or tolerance limits) are set by the 
Governor-General under advice from the Minister of Fisheries (Ministry of Fisheries 
2004b). These threshold levels state a minimum amount by which ACE holders can 
exceed their ACE holdings without being subject to a prohibition.
83 Thus, under this 
system the small ACE holders can exceed their over-fishing threshold by a small 
amount without suffering from permit prohibitions. 
 
To date, these two mechanisms have only been applied in sedentary species.  
 
                                                 
83 The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Fisheries can also provide an exemption to fishers to have 
their prohibition removed, but when these exemptions are granted they may include conditions relating 
to the fishing method and location to avoid the catch of the species exceeding the limit (FishServe 
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8. Future Directions 
 
Over time, social, political and economic environments change. No matter how good 
the system is for the current environment, all management systems need to have the 
flexibility to adapt to these changes over time. Consequently, the New Zealand QMS 
will continue to change to adapt to future conditions. Since New Zealand adopted the 
ITQ system early on, it was not possible for regulators to look to other countries’ 
experience to plan the QMS. Therefore, as experience with the system and its many 
enhancements grows, more effective methods may become apparent and subsequently 
implemented. As time goes on, the QMS may change significantly from the system in 
place today.  
 
There are a number of areas currently being examined. This chapter first discusses 
three main issues facing the Ministry at the moment – the precautionary approach, 
deepwater fisheries management, and recreational and shared fisheries. The Ministry 
is considering the use of an outcomes framework, fisheries plans and standards to 
address some of these challenges. These are discussed in the second half of this 
chapter. However, these policies are still being developed and are thus likely to 
change before they are implemented. But by including them within this report, readers 
will be able to gain some insight into changes that may occur in the near future. It will 
also provide a record of current options being considered by the Ministry.  
 
8.1 Current Areas of Focus 
 
8.1.1 Precautionary Approach 
In December 2006, the Minister of Fisheries announced his intention to amend the 
Fisheries Act 1996 to reflect the internationally-accepted precautionary approach. 
This would be applied where information on fisheries sustainability and the impact of 
fishing on the environment is uncertain or limited. At the time of writing (December 
2006), little policy background is available; in the coming months, a Cabinet paper 
will be drafted, a Bill introduced into the House, consideration and hearings by Select 
Committee, a departmental report prepared and a final Bill introduced. The Minister 
has announced his intention to have the new law in force in time to make decisions for 
sustainability measures for the 2007/08 fishing year. 
 
Based on available information, the proposed amendments would re-write section 10 
(the Information Principles) of the Fisheries Act 1996. Currently, Section 10 directs 
the Minister to be cautious when information is of poor quality, and not to avoid 
making a decision simply because of a lack of (or poor quality) information. Caution 
is to be exercised in order to achieve the dual purpose of the Act: utilisation and 
sustainability, neither of which has precedence over the other. If the FAO definition 
of precaution is adopted, the Fisheries Act will introduce a clear direction to favour 
sustainability when information is uncertain or incomplete. 
 
Information to manage fisheries is invariably uncertain or limited. The impact of the 
proposed changes would depend on the specific decisions being made, the stocks they   63
relate to, and the state of information about them. In general, it is unlikely to cause 
abrupt changes in current fisheries management measures. The net effect on harvest 
levels will either be neutral (where the Minister is confident that stocks are being 
fished sustainably) or will lead to a decrease in catch. Ultimately, there may be 
changes in the way that stock assessment is undertaken, and how management advice 
is prepared and presented to the Minister where information is uncertain or limited. 
 
8.1.2 Deepwater Fisheries 
While many species are fished by multiple fishing sectors, some fisheries are only 
harvested commercially, such as orange roughy. In these fisheries, there may be more 
effective ways of managing the resource than the methods - designed for all fish 
stocks - which are currently being used. Different management plans for these fish 
stocks may be appropriate for two reasons. First, since these fish stocks are only fish 
commercially the effect of (and on) customary and recreational fishers does not need 
to be considered. Second, commercial-only fisheries tend to be deepwater species, for 
which successful participation requires a significant investment. Consequently, these 
fish stocks tend to be dominated by a small number of large companies, which are 
increasingly becoming vertically and horizontally integrated.  
 
The majority of deepwater stocks are represented by the Deepwater Group Limited 
(incorporating the commercial stakeholder organisations that included the orange 
roughy management company, the hoki management company, and the squid 
management company). This streamlining of representation, along with increasing 
consolidation within industry, may simplify stakeholder interaction with the Ministry 
of Fisheries. Thus, pursuing alternative management methods for these fisheries may 
become feasible. 
 
Current management of deepwater fisheries can be characterised by the lack of a 
shared overall strategic plan, its poor integration and collaboration, and the limited 
ability of quota holders to influence or control the services implemented for 
deepwater stocks or the costs associated with those services. This results in an 
environment that is not conducive to collaboration or agreement. Considerable effort 
is expended by industry to engage in Ministry processes, and by the Ministry to 
respond to concerns raised by industry. 
 
Greater collaboration is desired and achievable, and different structural options can be 
considered. In the short term, the Deepwater Group and the Ministry are working to 
better integrate existing processes, and to identify where greater collaboration is 
warranted. Over the long term, greater collaboration can remove duplication of efforts 
and resources, remove inefficiencies in processes, and reduce business costs for both 
parties. 
 
8.1.3 Recreational Fishing 
There are a number of challenges facing policy makers with regard to recreational 
fishing, both as a sector on its own, but also its interaction with the commercial 
fishing sector. Regulators are only able to estimate (through voluntary surveys) the 
total recreational catch, as fishers are not required to report their catches. This makes 
it difficult to ensure that sustainable harvest levels are maintained and to accurately   64
set the TACC, which is vital for the QMS. There are also concerns regarding the 
process of allocating of the TAC between recreational, customary and commercial 
fishers as the share awarded to each is determined by the Minister. As this relies 
solely on the Minister’s discretion, there is considerable uncertainty regarding future 
catch levels and this makes planning difficult. 
 
To address some of these issues, the Ministry has initiated a public discussion process 
that includes various proposals for managing shared fisheries. The outcome will be 
determined by the sort of feedback received and the nature and extent of proposed 
changes to the regulatory framework. 
 
Chapter 5 provides more information on challenges relating to the recreational fishing 
sector and its relationship with the commercial fishing sector. 
 
8.2 Objectives-Based Management 
 
In the 2005-2008 Statement of Intent, the Ministry of Fisheries introduced the term 
“objective-based approach to fisheries management” (Ministry of Fisheries 2005c). 
This approach comprises a number of key components, including outcomes, 
standards, and fisheries plans.  
 
At its simplest, an objectives-based approach is being clear about what fisheries 
management is intended to achieve (the objectives), and designing management of a 
fishery to meet these objectives. Managing a fishery to achieve clearly defined 
objectives has advantages over other approaches, including: 
•  increased transparency in how and why fisheries are managed 
•  improved tangata whenua and stakeholder understanding, input and buy-in to 
the process of fisheries management 
•  easier decision-making 
•  a stronger link between objectives and management by better integrating 
science, policy, compliance, and other services  
•  increased confidence that government obligations will be met and the benefits 
obtained by stakeholders and tangata whenua maximised. 
 
8.2.1 Outcomes 
In the current fisheries legislation, the overriding goal is to achieve sustainable 
utilisation of fisheries resources (as outlined in Section 8 of the 1996 Fisheries Act). 
The remainder of the Act contains specific details about different areas of the system 
developed to achieve this purpose. However, there are no guidelines between the 
broad goal of sustainable utilisation and the specific details outlined in the remainder 
of the Act. Similarly, there is currently no link between the goal to ‘maximise the 
value New Zealanders obtain through the sustainable use of fisheries resources and 
protection of the aquatic environment’, and all the outputs and activities undertaken 
by fisheries managers. 
 
An ‘outcomes framework’ is a way to describe the desired results from the 
management process. The Ministry will be developing a hierarchy of outcomes to   65
determine what needs to be done in order to achieve the overall goal of ‘maximis[ing] 
value’. At the top, outcomes will be wide in scope and general, reflecting their use as 
goals of public policy. At the bottom, they will be more specific and focused, 
reflecting their focus for specific management of fisheries activities. At the lowest 
level of detail, the outcomes framework will detail standards which, together with 
fisheries plans, will drive fisheries management decision-making in the future. 
 
8.2.2 Fisheries Plans 
Fisheries plans are the main planning tool that will be used to implement objectives-
based management for specific fisheries. The primary purpose of a fisheries plan is to 
set out clear linkages between the objectives set for a fishery and the interventions and 
services used to achieve these objectives. 
 
While fisheries plans have been available in the legislation for a number of years,
84 
action has only recently been taken to create fisheries plans. The intent of the Ministry 
of Fisheries to utilise fisheries plans was introduced in the 2005-2008 Statement of 
Intent (Ministry of Fisheries 2005b) as part of the Government’s attempt to have more 
inclusive fisheries management, incorporating the views of different sectors involved 
in fishing.  
 
Fisheries plans will better define the roles of different stakeholders in managing 
fisheries resources to maximise the total value that is obtained (Ministry of Fisheries 
2005c). This approach utilises the knowledge of tangata whenua and stakeholders 
regarding the value of their fisheries and the clear ideas that these groups can have 
about the optimal management practices. By including these individuals into the 
decision making process, rather than the Ministry preparing management advice, and 
then seeking input, it is more likely that the value of the resource can be maximised. 
This process allows the stakeholders and tangata whenua to identify what they believe 
are the most important objectives for the management of their resource. 
 
Fisheries plans are still a new concept in New Zealand fisheries management and thus 
the process involved in their creation is still being developed. The legislation that 
governs the use of these plans only outlines the power of the Minister to approve, 
amend and revoke the plans, but does not stipulate the precise requirements of what 
the plan must contain. However, work has begun on the creation of fisheries plans for 
some species and detailed information on fisheries plans and the Ministry’s 
expectations of them can be found in the Fisheries Plan Framework (Ministry of 
Fisheries 2005c). 
 
In the future, the Ministry expects that fisheries plans will cover all species. More 
complex plans are likely to be developed as time goes on involving more species and 
stakeholders within a single plan. From the second half of 2006, the Ministry of 
Fisheries will be working on developing fisheries plans for all fisheries (Ministry of 
Fisheries 2006i). However, the initial plans will be preliminary and form the basis of 
the discussion with stakeholders and tangata whenua in the future. It will likely take 
                                                 
84 Fisheries plans were introduced in 1999 with the passing of the Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Act 
1999 which introduced Section 11A.   66
up to five years to have fully developed fisheries plans in place for most fisheries 




A standard describes minimum performance requirements for fisheries. Over time, 
standards will be developed to describe required results across all relevant facets of 
fisheries management. 
 
The main purpose of standards is to establish clear, specific, measurable statements of 
results. Standards fulfil three main functions: 
•  Guidance – Standards provide guidance to fisheries managers, tangata whenua 
and stakeholders on the Government’s expectations for the minimum level of 
performance expected from a fishery and the processes used to manage 
fisheries.  
•  Consistency – Different managers make similar types of decisions across a 
range of fisheries. In some situations, achieving an outcome will require a 
consistent approach across different fisheries. In these circumstances, 
standards help ensure a consistent approach. 
•  Monitoring – Standards describe a required result in a manner that enables the 
result to be monitored. Standards therefore provide a useful means of reporting 
on fisheries management performance. This enables both Government and 
stakeholders to track the performance of management strategies. 
 
Process standards will primarily define best practice for processes to achieve desired 
outcomes. Most of these processes are not constrained by the Fisheries Act 1996, 
although many are required to meet administrative law requirements. Performance 
standards set the minimum levels of performance in respect of specified components 
of ecosystems such as fish stock size and habitat structure, and the use of fisheries 
resources, including allocation between fisheries sectors. 
 
8.3 Into the Future 
 
The changes in policy that are outlined above and the Shared Fisheries Project 
represent substantial changes in fisheries management practice.
85 But since these new 
policies are still conceptual, changes may be made prior to their implementation as 
they continue to be developed.  
 
As time goes on, additional challenges to the QMS will present themselves as the 
environmental, social and political environments, both domestically and 
internationally, change. However, as it has done over the past 20 years, the QMS will 
continue to evolve and adapt to efficiently manage New Zealand fisheries in the 
future. 
 
                                                 
85 See Section 5.3.3 for more information on the Shared Fisheries Project.   67
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